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ABSTRACT 
 
State courts decide claims based on federal or sister-state law 
every day.  Although the applicable constitutional provisions 
are different, there are significant similarities in the way the 
Supreme Court conceptualizes the constraints on how those 
claims must be treated.  One project of this Article is to chart 
those similarities, providing a unified account of the Court’s 
approach to judicial federalism.  The larger project, however, 
is not to describe the Court’s approach, but to replace it.  The 
current emphasis on discrimination and interference imposes 
burdensome and unwarranted obligations on state courts.  A 
more flexible approach to judicial federalism is needed, and 
this Article takes important steps in that direction by 
developing a new analytical framework focused on prejudice.  
Prejudice may result when a state court renders a decision on 
the merits that does not adequately respect the law being 
applied.  Or it may result when the same court refuses to 
entertain a suit in circumstances where no alternative forum 
is available.  Neither result should be countenanced.  But 
when a state court declines to decide a claim, and does so in a 
way that produces no prejudice to the legal rights involved, 
the abstention should be tolerated—and perhaps even 
applauded. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Students typically enter law school with the 
understandable impression that Missouri courts decide 
claims based on Missouri law.  And in fact, that is primarily 
what they do.  But of course Missouri courts may also decide 
claims based on the laws of a sister state or the laws of the 
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United States.1 As with cases where federal courts decide 
state law claims, these situations implicate judicial 
federalism.  Unlike those cases, however, the issues 
surrounding the obligations of state courts remain 
understudied and undertheorized.2  
There are significant similarities in the Supreme 
Court's approach to the way state courts must treat claims 
derived from the law of another actor within the federal 
system.  The first project of this Article is to develop an 
account of the current doctrine.  To be sure, the applicable 
constitutional provisions are different.  Federal claims, which 
implicate vertical judicial federalism, are governed primarily 
by the Supremacy Clause, while sister-state claims, which 
implicate horizontal judicial federalism, are governed 
primarily by the Full Faith and Credit clause.  But in both 
the vertical and horizontal contexts, the factors that appear 
most relevant are discrimination and interference.  A state 
court has limited power to refuse to decide a case that falls 
within its standard jurisdictional rules, and even those rules 
may not be applied if they contribute to discrimination or 
interference.  In the horizontal context, doctrines like choice 
of law and forum non conveniens will often provide a route to 
mitigate the burdens that would otherwise be imposed, but 
in the vertical context states are obligated to decide the 
federal claim, and often to apply federal procedures, even if it 
is burdensome to do so. 
The second project of this Article is to argue that the 
doctrine surrounding judicial federalism should be 
                                                          
1 States may also decide claims based on the laws of a foreign country. 
The application of foreign law does not generally implicate constitutional 
concerns and is outside the scope of this Article. 
2 Kevin M. Clermont, Reverse-Erie, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 2 
(2006) (discussing lack of attention paid to reverse-Erie doctrine).  While 
it may still be the case that the Erie doctrine is undertheorized, it is 
certainly not for lack of effort.  See, e.g., Jay Tidmarsh, Substance, 
Procedure, and Erie, 64 VAND. L. REV. 877 (2011); Craig Green, 
Repressing Erie’s Myth, 96 CAL. L. REV. 595 (2008); Joseph P. Bauer, The 
Erie Doctrine Revisited:  How a Conflicts Perspective Can Aid the 
Analysis, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1235 (1999); John Hart Ely, The 
Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693 (1974). 
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reconceived.   The focus in these cases should be on whether 
a state court treats legal rights created by other actors 
within the federal system prejudicially.  At various points, 
the Supreme Court has gestured toward the concept of 
prejudice, but it has never made it a consistent and explicit 
factor in its analysis.  A focus on prejudice would still capture 
meaningful interference, but would tolerate and therefore de-
emphasize certain forms of discrimination.  It would ensure 
that rights created by other actors in the system are 
respected, but would provide states with increased flexibility 
to structure and administer their judicial systems.  In the 
end, it would pave the way for state court authority to 
decline to decide certain federal or sister-state claims, an 
authority which this article characterizes as reverse 
abstention. 
 
I.  DESCRIBING THE OLD MODEL 
 
A. Vertical Cases 
 
State courts are involved in vertical federalism when 
they are asked to decide federal claims.  In such cases, the 
body of law being applied is sourced in an exercise of federal 
power, and there are constitutional constraints that 
structure state-court application of federal law.  The 
fundamental constitutional principle in these cases is 
supremacy.  The Supremacy Clause in Article VI provides 
not only that the laws of the United States “shall be the 
supreme Law of the Land,” but also that “the Judges in every 
State shall be bound thereby.”3  Those provisions impose 
obligations on state courts to treat federal law in a particular 
way.  
But the Supremacy Clause has never been read to 
create an unlimited power by the federal government to 
control state courts, even with respect to the resolution of 
                                                          
3 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
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federal claims.4 Instead, the Supreme Court has articulated 
the contours of the obligations imposed by the Supremacy 
Clause in a series of cases dating back to Claflin v. 
Houseman in 1876.5  The defining principles that emerge 
from those cases is that state courts are constitutionally 
prohibited from applying rules that discriminate against 
federal claims, and cannot apply even facially neutral rules if 
those rules interfere with the vindication of federal interests.   
Parts of the antidiscrimination model of vertical 
federalism are relatively straightforward.  Claflin 
established the proposition that state courts should be 
presumed competent to hear federal claims.6  That is, absent 
some affirmative step taken by Congress to strip the state 
courts of jurisdiction,7 state courts are assumed to have 
                                                          
4 See Wendy E. Parmet, Stealth Preemption:  The Proposed 
Federalization of State Court Procedures, 44 VILL. L. REV. 1, 14 (1999); 
Martin H. Redish & Steven G. Sklaver, Federal Power to Commandeer 
State Courts:  Implications for the Theory of Judicial Federalism, 32 IND. 
L. REV. 71, 108 (1998).  Parmet and others more forcefully argue against 
unlimited Congressional control of state-court procedures in the 
adjudication of state-law claims.  Parmet, supra, at 39–41, 55; Anthony J. 
Bellia, Jr., Federal Regulation of State Court Procedures, 110 YALE L.J. 
947, 989 (2001).  However, other commentators have found a nearly 
unlimited power over state courts in the Supremacy Clause.  Saikrishna 
Bangalore Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 VA. L. REV. 1957, 2023 
(1993); Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy:  May 
Congress Commandeer State Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 
COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1029–30 (1995). 
5 93 U.S. (3 Otto) 130 (1876).  As discussed infra notes 6–7 and 
accompanying text, Claflin deals primarily with the authority rather 
than the obligation to hear federal claims.  The line of cases dealing with 
the obligation to decide federal claims starts instead with Mondou v. New 
York, N. H. & R. H. Co., 223 U.S. 1, 57 (1912). 
6 Id. at 136. 
7 Id.  The Court’s preemption doctrines inform how Congress may 
divest state courts of their presumed concurrent jurisdiction.  Such 
jurisdiction stripping may occur by express Congressional directive or by 
“unmistakable implication” found in the legislative history.  Tafflin v. 
Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 460–62 (1990).  The third option is a finding of 
“clear incompatibility” between state-court jurisdiction and federal 
interests. Id. at 464.  However, this method is fairly unhelpful since it can 
be overcome by two generally applicable arguments.  First, state-court 
adjudication of federal claims always promotes the federal interest in 
  
 
 
 Reverse Abstention 6 
authority to hear claims arising out of federal law.  But if a 
state court chooses to exercise that authority, it must do so in 
a way that respects the supremacy of federal law.      
Most fundamentally, a state court cannot choose to 
disregard the federal law.8  Deciding a claim that is properly 
governed by federal law according to the substantive law of 
the state is the clearest violation of federal supremacy 
imaginable.  The determination of when a claim is properly 
governed by federal law essentially boils down to a 
preemption analysis.9 If that analysis suggests that the 
federal law creates a particular cause of action, then that 
federal law must provide the rules of decision by which that 
cause of action is assessed.  The use of some other body of 
law is fundamentally inconsistent with the status of federal 
law as the "supreme Law of the Land."10  Accordingly, a state 
court is never permitted under the Supremacy Clause to 
discriminate against the application of substantive federal 
law by substituting some other law in its place. 
A state court is, however, generally permitted to apply 
its own procedural rules when deciding a federal claim.11  
                                                                                                                                         
enforcement of its laws.  Id. at 467.  Second, federal interest in uniformity 
of interpretation is preserved by the structural operations of state-court 
adjudication of federal claims:  state courts are bound by federal 
decisions, but federal courts are not likewise bound by state-court 
interpretations of federal law.  Id. at 464–65. 
8 See, e.g., Mondou v. New York, N. H. & R. H. Co., 223 U.S. 1, 57 
(1912); Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 392–93 (1947). 
9 Kevin M. Clermont, Reverse-Erie, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 40 
(2006); see also Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 
GEO. L.J. 2085, 2105 (2000) (discussing the weakness of the presumption 
against preemption in light of Felder).  As Louise Weinberg has 
suggested, the inquiry is not necessarily a detailed one.  Once a state 
court finds a federal interest, any countervailing state interests are 
useless in the face of the Supremacy Clause’s mandate.  Louise Weinberg, 
The Federal-State Conflict of Laws:  “Actual” Conflicts, 70 TEX. L. REV. 
1743, 1797 (1992). 
10 Louise Weinberg, The Federal-State Conflict of Laws:  “Actual” 
Conflicts, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1743, 1779 (1992). 
11 The classic statement of the state court’s right to apply its own 
procedure comes from Professor Hart:  “The general rule, bottomed 
deeply in belief in the importance of state control of state judicial 
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This is the subject of the “Reverse Erie” analysis, which is 
used to determine the circumstances under which a state is 
obligated to follow federal procedures in the course of 
enforcing federal substantive rights.  The Supreme Court's 
articulation of the contours of this analysis has not always 
been a model of clarity,12 but the consistent focus has been on 
the substantiality of the federal procedural rule at issue.  A 
federal procedural rule is binding on state courts deciding 
federal claims if it is valid13 and substantial in the sense that 
it is directly related to the vindication of the federal 
substantive right.     
The Supreme Court has developed these principles in 
four cases decided since Erie v. Tompkins.14  In Brown, the 
Court held that a strict state pleading rule could not be 
interposed to dismiss a federal claim when the parallel 
federal pleading rule would have permitted the claim to 
survive.15  The Court viewed the local rule as problematic 
because it “impose[d] unnecessary burdens upon rights of 
recovery authorized by federal laws.”16  Similarly, Dice held 
that state procedural rules regarding the allocation of 
factfinding between judge and jury could not be applied to 
displace the federal guarantee of trial by jury because that 
guarantee was “too substantial a part of the rights accorded 
by the Act.”17  More recently, the Court in Felder rejected the 
                                                                                                                                         
procedure, is that federal law takes the state courts as it finds them.”  
Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 
COLUM. L. REV. 489, 508 (1954). 
12 Kevin M. Clermont, Reverse-Erie, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 2 
(2006). 
13 Bradford R. Clark, The Supremacy Clause as a Constraint on 
Federal Power, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 91, 99–100 (2003).  The validity of 
procedural rules, at least when it comes to their operation in state courts, 
is rooted in the Necessary and Proper Clause.  Wendy E. Parmet, Stealth 
Preemption:  The Proposed Federalization of State Court Procedures, 44 
VILL. L. REV. 1, 18 (1999). 
14 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
15 Brown v. W. Ry. of Ala., 338 U.S. 294, 298–99 (1949). 
16 Id. at 298. 
17 Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R. Co., 342 U.S. 359, 363 
(1952). 
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application of a state notice-of-claim rule, in part because 
such a rule would produce different outcomes “based solely 
on whether the claim is asserted in state or federal court” 
and in part because it concluded that the state rule would 
interfere with “the substantial rights of the parties under 
controlling federal law.”18  But not all cases have found that 
state procedural rules must give way to competing federal 
rules.  In Johnson, the Court found that a state court was 
entitled to apply its own rules governing the right to appeal 
in a Section 1983 case.19  To the extent that the state court 
undermined a federal interest, the nature of the latter 
interest was purely procedural.20  As such, the state rule did 
not substantially affect the vindication of any substantive 
federal right, and the state was entitled to apply it.21 
The results in these cases can be cast in 
antidiscrimination terms.  A state court deciding a federal 
claim is bound to apply all parts of the federal law that are 
essential to the vindication of the federal substantive right.  
Failure to do so—either by applying state substantive law or 
state procedures that displace substantial federal 
procedures—results in unacceptable discrimination because 
the nature of the federal claim is affected by its location in a 
state court. Johnson highlights another dimension of this 
principle as well.  Central to that result was the Court's 
conclusion that the state procedure at issue was a “neutral 
state Rule regarding the administration of the state 
courts.”22  This step in the Court's analysis makes clear that 
a state procedural rule would be problematic if it applied 
exclusively to federal claims, even if the competing federal 
procedural rule would not otherwise be deemed as 
substantially related to the federal substantive right.  Put 
together, this suggests that state courts are not permitted to 
discriminate against federal law (by treating it differently 
                                                          
18 Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138, 151 (1988). 
19 Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 922–23 (1997). 
20 Id. at 918. 
21 Id. at 921-22. 
22 Id. at 918. 
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than it would be treated in federal court) or against federal 
claims (by treating them differently than state claims).     
The discussion thus far has centered around how a 
state court must treat federal claims once it has decided to 
hear them.  A harder question concerns the circumstances 
under which a state court is obligated to hear federal claims 
in the first place.  Stated conversely, this is the question of 
when the federal government is entitled to commandeer state 
courts for the resolution of federal claims.  A discussion of 
this issue must necessarily begin with Testa v. Katt.23  
There, a Rhode Island state court refused to enforce a federal 
statute that called for treble damages on the grounds that 
the statute was penal in nature.24  In overturning that 
refusal, the Supreme Court held that state courts have not 
just the power, but also the obligation to hear and enforce 
federal law claims when they share jurisdiction with the 
federal courts.25  Justice Black argued that permitting state 
courts to decline the enforcement of federal law “disregards 
the purpose and effect of [the Supremacy Clause].”26  
Therefore, the principles embedded in the Supremacy Clause 
granted to Congress a constitutional power to require state 
courts to decide federal claims.   
The scope and status of the federal power recognized 
in Testa was brought into question by the Supreme Court's 
                                                          
23 330 U.S. 386 (1947). 
24 Id. at 388.  Under a stalwart doctrine of choice of law, courts 
frequently refuse to enforce foreign penal laws.  The Rhode Island 
Supreme Court viewed the case as a straightforward application of that 
doctrine; Black’s response was that the doctrine could not be applied 
because it is impermissible for a state court to treat federal law as 
foreign.  Id. at 389 (“[W]e cannot accept the basic premise on which the 
Rhode Island Supreme Court held that it has no more obligation to 
enforce a valid penal law of the United States than it ahs to enforce a 
penal law of another state or a foreign country.  Such a broad assumption 
flies in the fact of the fact that the States of the Union constitute a 
nation.”). 
25 Id. at 390–91.  In his dissent in Haywood, Justice Thomas went 
further, arguing that a state’s power to adjudicate federal claims did not 
thereby create a duty to do so.  Haywood v. Drown, 129 S. Ct. 2108, 2121 
(2009). 
26 Id. at 389. 
  
 
 
 Reverse Abstention 10 
subsequent decisions regarding the power of Congress to 
require state legislatures and executives to enforce federal 
law.  New York imposed significant limits on the federal 
power to commandeer state legislative officials;27 Printz 
recognized similar limits on the power to commandeer state 
executive officials.28  In both cases, however, the Court went 
out of its way to distinguish judicial commandeering,29 and to 
reaffirm the comparatively broad power with respect to state 
judicial officials.  Thus, even after Printz and New York, 
Congress retains the power to impose on the state courts an 
obligation to hear and decide claims based on federal law.    
Though concededly broad, the power to commandeer 
under Testa is not unlimited.  Rather, the Court has 
consistently acknowledged that state courts might decline to 
hear federal claims if they have a valid excuse for doing so.  
The question, then, becomes: what constitutes a valid 
excuse?  The response to this question has led first and 
foremost to the development of a strong antidiscrimination 
principle.30  So it is clear that rejecting a claim on the 
grounds that the applicable law is federal in nature is not 
defensible on valid excuse grounds.31  This is hardly 
surprising; to find otherwise would be to undermine the 
commandeering power substantially.  On the other hand, the 
Court has often found occasion to repeat Henry Hart's 
                                                          
27 New York v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992). 
28 Printz v. U.S., 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997). 
29 Id. at 907; New York, 505 U.S. at 179–80.  Justice Scalia in the 
Printz opinion proffered several grounds for the distinction between 
state-court commandeering and commandeering state executives.  First, 
he claimed that the Framers envisioned state courts as necessary co-
arbiters of federal law.  Martin H. Redish & Steven G. Sklaver, Federal 
Power to Commandeer State Courts:  Implications for the Theory of 
Judicial Federalism, 32 IND. L. REV. 71, 77 (1998).  Second, Scalia noted 
that the Framers implied in Madisonian Compromise (and ultimately the 
Constitution’s text) the possibility that no lower federal courts would be 
created.  Id. at 78–79.  This would necessitate state courts as initial fora 
for federal claims.  Id. at 79.  Finally, Scalia found that the State Judges 
Clause created a “distinctive” view of state judiciary and compelled their 
compliance with federal law (and commandeering).  Id. 
30 See, e.g., Haywood, 129 S. Ct. 2108, 2116. 
31 Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 371 (1990). 
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observation “that federal law takes the state courts as it 
finds them.”32  Invocation of a “neutral rule of judicial 
administration” has therefore been upheld, even when the 
rule has been applied to refuse jurisdiction over a federal 
claim.33  In Herb, for example, a state court dismissed a 
FELA case on the grounds that the claim arose outside the 
court's territorial jurisdiction.34  The same rule would have 
led to the dismissal of a parallel state claim,35 and that 
neutrality rendered the rule a “valid excuse” to the obligation 
to hear the federal claim that would otherwise be imposed.   
Facial neutrality of that sort does not always 
immunize a state court refusal to hear federal claims, 
however.  In the most recent decision in this area, the 
Supreme Court in Haywood v. Drown rejected New York's 
decision to decline jurisdiction over a Section 1983 claim, 
even though the rule used to reach that result would also 
have led the court to decline jurisdiction over a parallel claim 
under state law.36  While recognizing that past decisions 
                                                          
32 See supra note 11; see also Mondou v. New York, 223 U.S. 1, 56 
(1912) (approving that Congress did not, in granting concurrent 
jurisdiction, attempt to control “[state] modes of procedure”); Howlett v. 
Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 372 (1990) (“[T]he requirement that a state court of 
competent jurisdiction treat federal law as the law of the land does not 
necessarily include within it a requirement that the State create a court 
competent to hear the case in which the federal claim is presented.”); 
Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 217 (1916) 
(finding that the Seventh Amendment jury right does not apply to state 
adjudications of federal claims);  Michael G. Collins, Article III Cases, 
State Court Duties, and the Madisonian Compromise, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 
40, 178 (1995)  (noting that “there is no ordinary requirement that state 
courts mimic federal courts procedurally when they hear federal 
matters”). 
33 See Douglas v. New York, N.H. & R.H. Co., 279 U.S. 377, 387 
(1912), Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 123 (1945), Missouri ex rel. 
Southern Ry. Co. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1950). 
34 Herb, 324 U.S. at 118–19. 
35 Id. at 123. 
36 Haywood v. Drown, 129 S. Ct. 2108, 2112–13 (2009).  New York’s 
Correction Law § 24, the statute at issue, divested New York’s general-
jurisdiction trial courts “of jurisdiction over § 1983 suits that seek money 
damages from correction officers.” Id. at 2112. 
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turned primarily on an assessment of the rule's equal 
application to both federal and state claims, Justice Stevens 
concluded that the absence of discrimination was not enough 
to bring a case within the valid excuse exception.37  Rather, 
“equality of treatment is . . . the beginning, not the end, of 
the Supremacy Clause analysis.”38 To get to the end of the 
analysis, it is necessary to move beyond equal treatment and 
consider whether the rule in question is truly jurisdictional 
in the sense that it "reflect[s] the concerns of power over the 
person and competence over the subject matter."39  In other 
words, the phrase “neutral rule of judicial administration” 
embodies a requirement not just that the rule be neutral, but 
also that it be a rule of judicial administration.  It was on 
this latter point that the majority concluded that the New 
York rule invoked in Haywood was problematic.  Although 
framed in terms of jurisdiction, Stevens viewed the rule as a 
reflection of a desire to provide substantive immunity to 
prison officials.40  Viewed that way, the application of the 
state rule was in clear violation not of the commandeering 
line of cases, but of the first category of cases discussed 
above.  For federal claims, federal law must provide the rules 
of decision, and resort to some other body of law is to treat 
the federal law as something less than supreme. 
For all of these decisions, the Court seems motivated 
by dual concerns about discrimination and interference.  A 
state court almost certainly runs into trouble if it applies a 
rule to a federal claim that it would not apply to an 
analogous state claim.41  This is true whether the rule 
invoked is procedural or jurisdictional.  In either case, the 
state's behavior is considered discriminatory, and such 
behavior can never be justified under existing doctrine.  But 
even if the state's behavior is not discriminatory, it may 
                                                          
37 Id. at 2116. 
38 Id. 
39 Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 381 (1990). 
40 See Haywood, 129 S. Ct. at 2118 (characterizing the rule as 
“effectively an immunity statute cloaked in jurisdictional garb” and 
concluding that the “Supremacy Clause cannot be evaded by formalism”). 
41 See id. at 2117 n.6. 
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nevertheless be problematic if it interferes with federal 
objectives.  The use of neutral state rules—whether 
procedural or jurisdictional as a matter of form—is 
acceptable only when those rules do not undermine federal 
interests in either intent or effect. 
 
B.  Horizontal Cases 
 
State courts are involved in horizontal federalism 
when they are asked to decide state law claims involving 
contacts with sister states.42  In such cases, the body of law 
being applied is state law, but there are federal 
constitutional constraints that structure the way that law is 
selected and applied.  Specifically, Section 1 of Article IV 
provides that “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each 
State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of 
every other State.”43  This provision imposes obligations on 
state courts to treat state claims with multistate contacts in 
a certain way.44   
For a relatively brief time, the Supreme Court 
experimented with a reading of the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause that would have given those obligations significant 
bite.  In Alaska Packers, the Court upheld a decision by a 
California court to apply its own law to an employment 
dispute involving both California and Alaska contacts.45  But 
                                                          
42 Even if they choose to apply their own law, there is still an element 
of horizontal federalism present when a state decides a case involving 
multistate contacts. 
43 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
44 The Due Process clause also imposes constraints in this situation.  
However, because the Court has developed a unified approach to the 
constitutional constraints on a state's horizontal choice of law—see 
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 307–08 (1981)—and because the 
other constraints discussed here arise out of the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause, I will focus on Full Faith and Credit.  See Kermit Roosevelt III, 
The Myth of Choice of Law:  Rethinking Conflicts, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2448, 
2506–07 (1999). 
45 Alaska Packers Ass’n v. Indus. Accident Comm’n of Cal., 294 U.S. 
532, 550 (1935).  California was the site of the employment contract and 
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the Court made clear that if its analysis had led it to 
conclude that Alaska's interest was greater, the choice of 
California law would have been problematic.46  In other 
words, Alaska Packers suggested strongly that the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause mandated the selection of the law of the 
state with the most significant interest, and that the 
ultimate responsibility for assessing the competing interests 
rested with the Court itself.47  
Almost immediately, however, the Court stepped back 
from that stance, and the choice-of-law obligations arising 
from the Full Faith and Credit Clause have been weak ever 
since.48  Under the current approach, a horizontal choice of 
law is constitutionally permissible so long as the state whose 
law is chosen has a significant interest in the case.49  As we 
shall see, this is not an altogether toothless formulation, but 
it provides states with significant flexibility in their choice of 
law analysis.  In moving from Alaska Packers to Allstate, the 
Court “rejected the siren song of balancing for the comfort of 
                                                                                                                                         
the domicile of the plaintiff.  Id. at 537–38.  Performance, however, 
occurred in Alaska, as well as the plaintiff’s injuries sued on.  Id. 
46 Id. at 549. 
47 The Alaska Packers decision may be seen as a retreat from earlier 
Court opinions that promoted a more territorial view of state-state 
conflicts, one that constitutionalized the traditional “vested rights” theory 
of conflicts.  Kermit Roosevelt III, The Myth of Choice of Law:  
Rethinking Conflicts, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2448, 2505 (1999).  However, if 
one subscribes fully to the territorial theories of Beale, it becomes clear 
that Alaska Packers was not so much a retreat as a sidestep:  it 
acknowledged that state statutes could conflict in disposing of a case, 
whereas Beale found that, since no state laws had extraterritorial effects, 
no conflicts ever truly exist.  Id. at 2504–05. 
48 See Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n of Cal., 
306 U.S. 493, 502–03 (1939) (finding “little room for [the full faith and 
credit compulsion to recognize or enforce a sister state’s law] when the 
statute of the forum is the expression of domestic policy, in terms 
declared to be exclusive in its application to persons and events within 
the state”); Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469, 476 (1947) 
(requiring only “some substantial connection between the [state] and the 
particular employee-employer relationship” governed by the statute at 
issue, and rejecting the necessity of “the fortuitous circumstance” that the 
forum state be “the place of [the plaintiff’s] work or injury”).  
49 Allstate, 449 U.S. at 312–13. 
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minimal scrutiny.”50  The scrutiny under the modern 
approach may be fairly characterized as minimal in part 
because it is weak.  Any “significant contact or significant 
aggregation of contacts, creating state interests” will do.51  
But the scrutiny is also minimal in the sense that it is 
focused exclusively on the ultimate results of the choice of 
law analysis.  That is, the Court applies its weak test only to 
assess the relationship between the case and the state whose 
law is chosen.52  But as to the process by which that initial 
choice is made, the Court has essentially declared that the 
Constitution is uninterested.53  
One of the implications of this framework is that the 
public policy exception, a choice of law doctrine that looks 
facially suspicious, escapes constitutional scrutiny.  Public 
policy exceptions have long been stalwarts of choice of law 
analysis, and they were folded into state practice in the 
United States without much consideration or controversy.54  
They operate essentially to override a choice of law that 
would otherwise be made on the grounds that the law 
selected is somehow offensive or undesirable.55  And although 
the classic formulation of the doctrine resulted in dismissal 
                                                          
50 Richman & Reynolds, Full Faith and Credit 43 
51 Allstate, 449 U.S. at 313. 
52 Id.; compare Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 819–
820, 822 (1985) (reversing Kansas Supreme Court’s application of Kansas 
law where the state lacked sufficient “interest” in the case), with Sun Oil 
Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 730 (1988) (concluding that Kansas courts 
may apply their own statute of limitations to multistate claims because of 
Kansas’s interest in “regulating the work load of its courts and 
determining when a claim is too stale to be adjudicated”). 
53 Allstate, 449 U.S. at 307 (concluding that it was “not for this Court” 
to assess the “choice-of-law analysis,” but instead focusing on whether the 
“choice” made comported with constitutional limits). 
54 Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the 
Unconstitutional Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 1971–72 
(1997). 
55 Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198, 202 (N.Y. 1918) (finding 
that a law may be refused under the public policy exception where its 
application “would violate some fundamental principle of justice, some 
prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the 
common weal”). 
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on jurisdictional grounds,56 it has long been common for 
states to invoke the doctrine to justify a substitution of some 
other law—almost always forum law.57  It at least has an 
appearance of oddity for one state of our union to refuse 
application of the law of another state based on a judgment 
about the competing law's content.58 Indeed, Larry Kramer 
has provocatively suggested that such a refusal is not simply 
odd, but is in fundamental and unavoidable tension with the 
core of what the Full Faith and Credit Clause was designed 
to accomplish.59  Even so, the Supreme Court has never 
seriously questioned the exception.  Under the current 
approach, the mechanism of the public policy doctrine is 
never directly assessed because it is considered merely a part 
of the analysis that produces the choice.  And the choice itself 
is all that matters; mechanisms are outside the scope of the 
Court's concern.60   
Despite the minimal nature of the Court's review of 
horizontal choice of law decisions, some limitations have 
emerged.  The most straightforward and predictable of these 
is that the selection of the law of a state that has no 
significant relationship to a claim will be rejected.  So in 
Shutts, a Kansas state court violated constitutional 
                                                          
56 Id. (courts cannot “close their doors” unless the offensive law 
violates public policy). 
57 Monrad G. Paulsen & Michael I. Sovern, “Public Policy” in the 
Conflict of Laws, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 969, 979–80 (1956). 
58 Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the 
Unconstitutional Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 1972 
(1997) (emphasizing that the doctrine is "a content-based principle"). 
59 Id. at 1980; Monrad G. Paulsen & Michael I. Sovern, “Public Policy” 
in the Conflict of Laws, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 969, 1008–10 (1956) (noting 
that using the public policy exception as a residual equity principle to 
avoid injustice in individual cases is “dangerous”); but see Richard S. 
Myers, Same-Sex “Marriage” and the Public Policy Doctrine, 32 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 45, 56–57 (1998). 
60 See supra note 53.  Indeed, the Court was unwilling to call the 
public policy exception into question even when it embraced balancing.  
Alaska Packers simultaneously concluded that a decision to apply forum 
law could be sustained on a finding that the foreign law was offensive to 
forum policy.  Alaska Packers Ass’n v. Indus. Accident Comm’n of Cal., 
294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935).   
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constraints when it applied its own law to certain claims 
brought by non-Kansans against a Delaware defendant to 
recover interest on royalty payments arising from the 
ownership of land outside Kansas.61  Aside from the fact that 
they had been filed there, Kansas had no connection at all to 
those out-of-state claims, and thus the selection failed even a 
weak test applied only to the results of the choice of law 
process.62  But Shutts is notable not just for its enforcement 
of the constitutional constraint on choice of law; it is also 
noteworthy for the rarity of that result.63   
The second limitation is somewhat more complex.  In a 
series of cases—most notably Hughes v. Fetter—the Court 
has read the Full Faith and Credit Clause to constrain a 
state court's power to reject claims that arise out of the law of 
another state.64  Hughes is a confusing case, and it is 
frequently viewed as enigmatic or a sport.65  Nevertheless, an 
understanding of the case helps to clarify the underlying 
principle that the Court has developed in cases implicating 
horizontal federalism.  Hughes and Fetter were in a car 
                                                          
61 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 799–803 (1985). 
62 Id. at 822. 
63 See, e.g., In re K.M.H., 169 P.3d 1025, 1031–32 (Kan. 2007) 
(finding under Shutts and Allstate that Kansas, as the domicile of both 
parties, had contacts sufficient to warrant application of its own law); 
Vanderbilt Mortg. & Fin., Inc. v. Posey, 146 S.W.3d 302, 317 (Tex. App. 
2004) (finding that Texas had sufficient contacts to satisfy full faith and 
credit because the plaintiffs were Texas residents and the contract was 
executed there); see also Olmstead v. Anderson, 400 N.W.2d 292, 305 
n.13 (Mich. 1987) (noting that the limitations on choice of law imposed by 
Allstate and Shutts are “rather meager”); Arons v. Rite Aid Corp., 2005 
WL 975462 (N.J. 2005)(unpublished opinion).  
64 Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 612–13 (1951); Broderick v. Rosner, 
294 U.S. 629, 642–43 (1935); First Nat’l Bank of Chi. v. United Air Lines, 
Inc., 342 U.S. 396, 307–98 (1952). 
65 See Brainerd Currie, The Constitution and the “Transitory” Cause 
of Action, 73 HARV. L. REV. 36, 36 (1959); Larry Kramer, Same-Sex 
Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public Policy 
Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 1980–81 (1997) (labeling Justice Black’s 
opinion “short” and “impressionistic”); Lea Brilmayer, Credit Due 
Judgments and Credit Due Laws:  The Respective Roles of Due Process 
and Full Faith and Credit in the Interstate Context, 70 IOWA L. REV. 95, 
109 (1984). 
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accident in Illinois; Hughes died, and the administrator of 
his estate filed a wrongful death action against Fetter (and 
his insurer) in Wisconsin.66  Wisconsin was an 
understandable forum because all relevant parties were from 
there.  Even so, recovery was sought under the Illinois 
wrongful death statute, primarily because the Wisconsin 
statute permitted recovery only for deaths within the state.67  
But recovery was denied, and the case was dismissed on the 
merits, because the Wisconsin state court interpreted its 
wrongful death statute as establishing “a local public policy 
against Wisconsin's entertaining suits brought under the 
wrongful death statutes of other states.”68  
Justice Black might have concluded that the dismissal 
in Hughes was problematic because the interest of Illinois 
was greater than the interest of Wisconsin, and thus full 
faith and credit precluded Wisconsin from applying its own 
law to the claim. But by the time Hughes was decided, the 
Supreme Court had abandoned a balancing approach to full 
faith and credit, and the proper question would therefore 
have been whether Wisconsin had a significant interest in 
the case.  The answer to that question was certainly yes; 
indeed, Black conceded as much.69  But if Wisconsin had an 
interest that justified the application of its own law, what 
precisely was the problem with the dismissal?  The problem 
was that Wisconsin did not actually apply its own law to the 
claim.  Instead, it invoked the Wisconsin wrongful death 
statute only as evidence of a state policy against deciding 
claims arising under foreign law.  It was that state policy, 
and not the substantive limitations of Wisconsin's statute, 
that mandated dismissal.  Put differently, Wisconsin's 
conclusion was not that its own law should be applied, but 
that the law of Illinois could not be.   
At this point, one can begin to understand the 
confusion wrought by Hughes.  It seems strange that the full 
                                                          
66 Hughes, 341 U.S. at 610. 
67 Id. at 610 n.2. 
68 Id. at 610. 
69 Id. at 611–12, 612 n. 10. 
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faith and credit problem stems not from the result—
dismissal—but from the means by which the result was 
reached.  It seems stranger still that the use of a public 
policy exception to support the selection of Wisconsin law 
would have been sustained, while the use of what is 
essentially a jurisdictional rule rooted in public policy was 
rejected.70  But properly understood, the case is not as 
strange as it seems.  What cases like Pacific Employers 
established was that the Supreme Court is unwilling to 
police the mechanics of the choice of law process; it will focus 
merely on outputs.  But the output of the choice of law 
process in Hughes was that Illinois should govern.  
Wisconsin then refused to heed the outcome of its own choice-
of-law analysis based on a separate policy that required the 
rejection of non-Wisconsin claims.  It was precisely the 
separate, or exogenous, nature of the Wisconsin policy that 
triggered the constitutional defect.71  What Hughes stands 
for, then—and what it adds to the framework established 
above—is that the use of such a separate policy to override a 
choice of law is unacceptable.  If Wisconsin's choice-of-law 
analysis had concluded with a selection of Wisconsin law, the 
court would have heard the claim.  But since Wisconsin's 
analysis concluded with a selection of non-Wisconsin law, the 
court rejected the claim.  These results create a “basic 
conflict” with the “strong unifying principle embodied in the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause.”72  So it remains true even 
after Hughes that the Supreme Court will look only at the 
result of the choice of law analysis, and will not venture into 
a consideration of choice-of-law mechanisms.  At the same 
time, once the analysis yields a result, the state is compelled 
                                                          
70 See Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the 
Unconstitutional Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 1983–84 
(1997) (arguing that Hughes supports a conclusion that the public policy 
doctrine is constitutionally suspect because it is discriminatory). 
71 That makes Hughes quite different from a case where public policy 
is considered in a way that is endogenous to the choice-of-law analysis. 
72 Hughes, 341 U.S. at 612. 
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to follow it, and the application of an exogenous rule that is 
sensitive to the result is constitutionally suspect.73  
It is in this sense that Hughes embodies an 
antidiscrimination principle.74  Indeed, the Court has 
characterized its opinion in precisely those terms.  Just two 
years after Hughes, the Court described as its “crucial factor” 
that “the forum laid an uneven hand on causes of action 
arising within and without the forum state.  Causes of action 
arising in sister states were discriminated against.”75  As 
such, Hughes is a kindred spirit to the cases in the vertical 
federalism setting that limit the ability of states to refuse to 
hear federal cases based on rules that are not equally 
applicable to federal and non-federal claims.76  Stating the 
                                                          
73 Moreover, it does not matter whether the exogenous rule is framed 
in terms of affecting jurisdiction (as in Hughes) or available remedies.  
Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 642–43 (1935) (finding that a state 
“may not, under the guise of merely affecting the remedy, deny the 
enforcement of claims otherwise within the protection of the full faith and 
credit clause”).  At the very least, if it does make its selection on the basis 
of such a rule, that decision must pass something akin to an intermediate 
scrutiny.  See Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and 
the Unconstitutional Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 1984 
(1997).  The application of an exogenous rule that applies equally 
regardless of the outcome of the choice-of-law analysis would not trigger 
the same constitutional concerns.  Then again, if such a rule were in 
place, it would not be necessary for the state to even conduct a choice-of-
law analysis before applying it. 
74 Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the 
Unconstitutional Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 1984 
(1997) (describing Hughes in antidiscrimination terms); Kermit Roosevelt 
III, The Myth of Choice of Law:  Rethinking Conflicts, 97 MICH. L. REV. 
2448, 2511–15 (1999) (same). 
75 Wells v. Simons Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514, 518–19 (1953). This 
formulation can be read to support a distinction between Hughes and 
cases based on the public policy exception, at least insofar as the latter 
would lead the state to conclude that the cause of action actually arose 
under its own law. 
76 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.  The antidiscrimination 
principle in the vertical setting is clearly stronger.  Whereas a facially 
neutral jurisdictional rule would likely pass muster in the horizontal 
setting, cases like Haywood make clear that even facially neutral rules 
may pose constitutional problems if they discriminate against federal law 
in their effect.  See supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text. 
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rule broadly to encompass both situations, we might say that 
if a state opens its courts to a certain type of claim, those 
courts must be open to hearing that claim regardless of the 
source of law.77 
 
II. QUESTIONING THE OLD MODEL 
 
The model of judicial federalism that the Supreme 
Court has developed is based almost exclusively on 
considerations of discrimination and interference.  This is not 
to say that the analysis is identical in the horizontal and 
vertical contexts.  The constitutional provisions associated 
with those two contexts are different, and the analysis is 
understandably sensitive to that difference.  But both lines of 
                                                          
77 It may be unclear whether the constitutional obligations to apply 
federal procedure in the vertical context also apply in the horizontal 
context.  Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1, 24 (1910) (“[A]lthough mere modes 
of execution provided by the laws of a state in which a judgment is 
rendered are not, by operation of the full faith and credit clause, 
obligatory upon the courts of another state in which the judgment is 
sought to be enforced, nevertheless, if the judgment be an enforceable 
judgment in the state where rendered, the duty to give effect to it in 
another state clearly results from the full faith and credit clause, 
although the modes of procedure to enforce the collection may not be the 
same in both states.”); Bowles v. J.J. Schmitt & Co., 170 F.2d 617, 622 n.6 
(2d Cir. 1948) (finding that sister-state judgments should be enforced 
“whatever the local procedure”).  However, modern discussion by the 
Court and Circuits seems to find that the obligation does not apply to the 
horizontal arena.  See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 726–29 
(1988) (holding that constitutionalizing choice-of-law rules would be 
undesirable and that even if certain substance/procedure 
characterizations under state law may be “unwise,” they are not thereby 
“unconstitutional”); Baker by Thomas v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 
222, 235 (1998) (“Full faith and credit, however, does not mean that 
States must adopt the practices of other States regarding the time, 
manner, and mechanisms for enforcing judgments. Enforcement 
measures do not travel with the sister state judgment as preclusive 
effects do; such measures remain subject to the evenhanded control of 
forum law.”); Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553, 560 (2d 
Cir. 1962) (rejecting the notion that the “incidents” of a sister state’s 
claim must be enforced when the forum gives full faith and credit to the 
claim itself). 
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cases can be usefully cast in terms of discrimination and 
interference.  In this Part, I question the continuing 
emphasis on those two factors.  A decision to refuse a case— 
whether state or federal—has long been considered a form of 
interference that raises constitutional concerns.  But while it 
may at one point have been true that such a refusal would 
result in meaningful interference, there are reasons to think 
that that may no longer be the case.  In terms of 
discrimination, the Court has been generally unwilling to 
accept jurisdictional or procedural rules that distinguish 
between forum-based claims and other claims.  Recently, 
however, Justice Thomas has articulated a vision of the 
Supremacy Clause in the vertical context that suggests that, 
at least for jurisdictional rules, discrimination should be 
tolerated.78  That vision is not wholly persuasive, but it 
points the way toward a new thinking of judicial federalism 
that might better balance the power of states to control their 
judicial systems and the need to respect federal and sister 
state claims.  
  
A. Rethinking Interference 
 
1. Vertical Cases 
  
Much of the discussion concerning the federal power to 
commandeer state courts centers around the original 
understanding of the authority given to Congress in the 
"ordain and establish" clause of the Constitution.79  This 
clause is the product of the so-called Madisonian 
Compromise, struck between those like Madison who wanted 
                                                          
78 See Haywood v. Drown, 129 S. Ct. 2108, 2132 (2009) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
79 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.  The State Judges Clause has also been 
cited as a basis for commandeering, though perhaps with less persuasive 
force.  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; compare Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, 
Field Office Federalism, 79 Va. L. Rev. 1957, 2011–13 (1993), with 
Martin H. Redish & Steven G. Sklaver, Federal Power to Commandeer 
State Courts:  Implications for the Theory of Judicial Federalism, 32 IND. 
L. REV. 71, 81 (1998). 
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to create lower federal courts and those like Rutledge who 
viewed their creation as unnecessary and even dangerous.80  
Rather than resolve that disagreement definitively, the 
Constitution as ratified created only one federal court—the 
Supreme Court—but gave Congress power to create others.81  
In essence, then, the question of whether a system of inferior 
federal courts should be established was deferred and de-
constitutionalized with the inclusion of the "ordain and 
establish" language.82  
At the same time, the Constitution conferred original 
jurisdiction on the Supreme Court that was quite limited.83  
This meant that many cases falling within the "judicial 
Power of the United States" described in Article III, and 
particularly those "arising under . . . the Laws of the United 
States," did not fall within the Court's original jurisdiction.84  
The fact that the Constitution provided no guarantee that 
federal claims could be adjudicated in a federal forum has led 
to an assertion that the Framers must have contemplated 
that state courts would be available for those claims.85  
                                                          
80 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 124 (Max 
Farrand ed., 1937). 
81 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
82 Beyond the fact of their creation, some constitutional concerns 
remain in play when considering Article III courts.  For instance, the old 
adage that “the greater power includes the lesser” has been used to argue 
that Congress may strip jurisdiction from lower federal courts merely 
because it gave them the power in the first place.  Peter J. Smith, 
Textualism and Jurisdiction, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1883, 1892–93 (2008).  
However, this structural argument is fundamentally misguided, 
particularly when considering important remedies associated with vital 
constitutional rights.  See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Jurisdiction-Stripping 
Reconsidered, 96 VA. L. REV. 1043, 1134 (2010) (“Congress cannot use its 
power to control jurisdiction to preclude constitutionally necessary 
remedies for the violation of constitutional rights.”). 
83 Louise Weinberg, Our Marbury, 89 VA. L. REV. 1235, 1363 (2003). 
84 See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.  
85 Matthew I. Hall, Asymmetrical Jurisdiction, 58 UCLA L. REV. 
1257, 1263 (2011); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Field Office 
Federalism, 79 VA. L. REV. 1957, 2021 (1993); see also James E. Pfander, 
Federal Supremacy, State Court Inferiority, and the Constitutionality of 
Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 191, 216 
(concluding that Hamilton held Article III to allow Congress to 
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Indeed, the claim is even stronger than that, for it 
encompasses not just the idea that state courts would be 
available, but that state courts could be made to be 
available.86  In short, the argument is that the original 
design of the Constitution contains within it a provision for 
the commandeering of state courts.87 
Building on claims rooted in constitutional design, 
supporters of a broad commandeering power next move to 
early Congressional practice.  Congress quickly exercised its 
power to create lower federal courts, but the jurisdiction 
conferred on those courts was initially limited.88  Congress 
did not see fit to confer general federal question jurisdiction 
on the lower federal courts until 1875.89   This is said to 
provide additional evidence for the proposition that state 
                                                                                                                                         
“constitute” the state courts as inferior federal tribunals); but see Michael 
G. Collins, Article III Cases, State Court Duties, and the Madisonian 
Compromise, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 40, 55 (1995) (arguing that these 
jurisdictional gaps represented “enclaves” of exclusively federal 
jurisdiction that compelled the creation of lower federal courts). 
86 States could not escape this compulsion even by the extreme 
measure of abolishing their judiciary entirely.  Vicki C. Jackson, Printz 
and Testa:  The Infrastructure of Federal Supremacy, 32 IND. L. REV. 
111, 113 (1998); see also Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Field Office 
Federalism, 79 VA. L. REV. 1957, 2012 (1993) (arguing that the 
Constitution forces state judges to serve as instruments of federal 
government).  Thus Hart’s refrain that Congress takes state courts as it 
finds them may not actually reach its furthest logical extension. 
87 Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 VA. L. 
REV. 1957, 2022 (1993) (“Our Constitution, since it presumes federal 
jurisdiction for state courts, itself commandeers state courts.”). 
88 Perhaps clearest example is the limited nature of federal 
jurisdiction granted in the Judiciary Act of 1789, in which Congress 
created jurisdictional gaps that denied federal review of federal questions 
in certain cases, imposed an amount-in-controversy requirement, and 
rejected any notion of general federal question jurisdiction.  Paul Taylor, 
Congress’s Power to Regulate the Federal Judiciary:  What the First 
Congress and the First Federal Courts Can Teach Today’s Congress and 
Courts, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 847, 861–63, 876–80 (2010). 
89 Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470.  The Midnight Judges 
Act of 1801 attempted to create federal-question jurisdiction, see Act of 
Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, § 11, 2 Stat. 89, 92, but it was soon repealed by the 
Jeffersonian Republican Congress, which was distrustful of a powerful 
federal government. See Act of Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8, § 1, 2 Stat. 132, 132. 
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courts were understood to be both competent and obligated to 
hear federal claims.90  If state courts did not hear federal 
claims not included within a federal jurisdictional statute, no 
court would.  As a matter of necessity, then, Congress must 
have had the power to allocate certain federal claims to state 
courts.  And if that power existed prior to the creation of 
general federal question jurisdiction, then it must also exist 
now.91   
The vestiges of the Madisonian Compromise have 
carried over to modern discussions about the scope of the 
federal commandeering power.  In Printz, for example, 
Justice Scalia rehearsed many of the arguments associated 
with constitutional structure and early congressional 
practice to support his assertion that federal commandeering 
of state judiciaries could be easily distinguished from federal 
commandeering of state legislatures or executives.92  But the 
Madisonian Compromise grew out of uncertainty that has 
been resolved definitively for more than a century.93  That 
                                                          
90 Michael G. Collins, Article III Cases, State Court Duties, and the 
Madisonian Compromise, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 39, 47 (1995) (since federal 
courts are merely optional under the Constitution, “there was a 
possibility that state courts would be the exclusive adjudicators of federal 
questions and enforcers of federal rights in the first instance.”). 
91 See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 339 (1816) (noting that 
state courts must logically hear federal claims if Congress decided not to 
constitute lower federal courts and the Supreme Court would have only 
appellate jurisdiction in the case); Lawrence Gene Sager, Constitutional 
Limitations on Congress’s Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the 
Federal Courts, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 17, 21–22 (1981) (acknowledging 
Congress’s power to strip jurisdiction from federal tribunals, but noting 
the sometimes serious constitutional considerations that limit its 
discretion in jurisdiction stripping). 
92 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 907-08 (1997).  Justice 
Scalia’s constitutional argument emphasized the "state judges" language 
in the Supremacy Clause.  Id. at 907. 
93 Indeed, the Framers themselves anticipated and welcomed the 
eventual resolution of their misgivings embodied in the Madisonian 
Compromise. See THE FEDERALIST No. 38 (James Madison) (Jacob E. 
Cooke ed., 1961) (urging that the answers to the errors inherent in the 
Constitution “will not be ascertained until an actual trial shall have 
pointed them out”); THE FEDERALIST No. 82 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob 
  
 
 
 Reverse Abstention 26 
resolution may alter the way that we should think about the 
interaction of state and federal courts today.  Put differently, 
it may be true that the system of lower federal courts took 
time to develop, and that Congress did not confer general 
federal question jurisdiction on those lower courts until 1875.  
But it is also true that the system of lower federal courts is 
now firmly established, that their jurisdiction is stable, and 
that it is difficult to imagine that that state of affairs will 
change anytime soon.94 
The existence of a developed and secure system of 
federal courts has implications for the effects produced by the 
treatment (or mistreatment) of federal claims by state courts.  
In the nineteenth century, a decision by a state court to 
refuse a case rooted in federal law would seriously 
undermine a plaintiff’s ability to pursue the federal claim.  A 
plaintiff in that position might have been able to take the 
claim to the courts of a different state that was more 
amenable to federal cases.  But territorial restrictions on 
personal jurisdiction would have made that a difficult 
proposition in many cases,95 and even where such a move 
was possible, the burden imposed on the plaintiff would often 
be severe.96  In terms of practical effect, then, a state court’s 
refusal to entertain a federal claim would often be the 
equivalent of a decision to extinguish the claim altogether.  
Today, by contrast, the same refusal has far less pernicious 
consequences.  If a federal claim is refused by a state court, a 
plaintiff may take the action to federal court, and the subject 
                                                                                                                                         
E. Cooke ed., 1961) (observing that “‘[t]is time only that can mature and 
perfect so compound a system”). 
94 Modern jurisdiction-stripping bills do not challenge the federal 
courts’ broad and entrenched federal-question jurisdiction.  Howard M. 
Wasserman, Jurisdiction, Merits, and Non-Extant Rights, 56 U. KAN. L. 
REV. 227, 229 (2008).   
95 Broad minimum-contacts doctrines, established later in 
International Shoe, would not have been available to the litigious 
nineteenth-century American. See generally Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 
714 (1877) (requiring consent, domicile, or service of process in the forum 
state to gain personal jurisdiction over a defendant). 
96 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 124 (Max 
Farrand ed., 1937). 
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matter jurisdiction provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1331, together 
with the personal jurisdiction provided by Rule 4(k)(1)(A), all 
but ensures that the doors of the federal court will be open.97  
To be sure, the move from state to federal court may carry 
with it some inconvenience.98  But it is almost inconceivable 
that a non-prejudicial dismissal of a federal claim by a state 
court would have the practical effect of rendering the federal 
claim unenforceable. 
  
2. Horizontal Cases 
 
Perhaps the most well-known formulation of the public 
policy exception in choice of law comes from then-Judge 
Cardozo in Loucks v. Standard Oil Co.99  Loucks was from 
New York, but was killed while traveling in 
Massachusetts.100  His relatives brought an action in New 
York seeking recovery, and argued that a Massachusetts 
statute limiting recovery should not be applied.101  Cardozo 
conceded that as the place of injury, the law of 
                                                          
97 See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006); FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A).  If for some 
reason the plaintiff is determined to remain in state court, then the more 
flexible personal jurisdiction doctrines under the regime initiated by 
International Shoe make it more likely that another state court could 
acquire personal jurisdiction over the defendant and decide the federal 
claim.  See, e.g., Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); 
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292–94 (1980); 
Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987).  For 
further discussion of the role of developments in the domain of personal 
jurisdiction, see infra notes 110–111 and accompanying text. 
98 These inconveniences primarily involve the burden of refiling, but 
may include increased burdens on plaintiffs in the areas of pleading and 
summary judgment.  See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 
555–56 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949–50 (2009); 
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587–88 
(1986); Bias v. Advantage Intern., Inc., 905 F.2d 1558, 1561 (D.C. Cir. 
1990).  However, they do not categorically rule out a plaintiff’s claim, and 
every day plaintiffs meet and overcome these obstacles in asserting rights 
in federal courts. 
99 120 N.E. 198 (1918). 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
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Massachusetts would normally be selected, and he 
acknowledged that Massachusetts law differed from that of 
New York, which had no cap on damages.102  But he then 
concluded that it would nevertheless be inappropriate to 
refuse the application of the Massachusetts law on grounds 
of public policy.103  In his words, such a refusal should occur 
only when the application of foreign law “would violate some 
fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception 
of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common 
weal.”104   
Loucks is notable in part because it articulates an 
exception that is narrow and would be triggered only 
rarely.105  Mere disagreements with the policy choices made 
by sister states are insufficient under his formulation.  But it 
is notable also because it frames the exception explicitly as 
one that implicates the court’s jurisdiction.106 That is, a 
finding that a foreign law violates the public policy of the 
forum state would result in a dismissal of the case on 
jurisdictional grounds.  To Cardozo, the choice in Loucks was 
to apply Massachusetts law or to decline the case altogether.   
At the time that Loucks was decided, the jurisdictional 
nature of the public policy exception meant that its 
invocation would often have serious implications for the 
status of the claim.  Obviously, dismissal would mean that 
the claim could not be brought in the forum state.  But due to 
the territorial nature of the personal jurisdiction doctrine,107 
it could also mean that the claim could not be brought at all. 
Loucks is illustrative here.  The plaintiffs, administrators of 
Loucks’s estate, were undoubtedly attracted to New York as 
                                                          
102 Id. at 201. 
103 Id. at 202. 
104 Loucks, 120 N.E. at 202. 
105 Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the 
Unconstitutional Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 1972–73 
(1997). 
106 Loucks, 120 N.E. at 200 (“Even though the statute is not penal, it 
differs from our own.  We must determine whether the difference is a 
sufficient reason for declining jurisdiction.”) 
107 See supra note 95. 
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a convenient forum for the suit.  But New York was a proper 
forum only because the defendant, Standard Oil, was also 
from New York and so could be served there.  Were the New 
York courts to refuse to hear the claim, the resulting 
dismissal would have been without prejudice, leaving the 
plaintiffs free to take the claim to a state willing to apply the 
Massachusetts law.  Massachusetts, of course, would be the 
most likely candidate, but acquiring personal jurisdiction 
over the defendant there may have presented a challenge.  
Perhaps Massachusetts would have been willing to bend 
Pennoyer’s “presence” or “consent” requirements in an effort 
to reach Standard Oil,108 but it is at least conceivable that 
jurisdiction would be found lacking.   
Indeed, in cases involving individuals rather than 
corporations, it is even easier to imagine that the state of the 
defendant’s residence would be the only available forum from 
the standpoint of personal jurisdiction.  To use an example 
familiar to conflicts scholars, consider a suit by an injured 
West Virginia passenger against a West Virginia driver 
stemming from an automobile accident occurring in Indiana.  
Indiana permits recoveries by guests, but West Virginia does 
not.  Under the First Restatement, Indiana law should apply 
as the place of injury, but West Virginia might conclude that 
permitting recovery would violate the public policy of the 
forum.109  If the court dismissed jurisdictionally, it would 
essentially be delivering the message that although West 
Virginia would play no part, Indiana remains free to enforce 
its own law and vindicate the claim.  But unless the 
defendant returned to Indiana (and based on how the first 
trip went, return might be unlikely), that resolution provides 
                                                          
108 See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927) (allowing implied 
consent in an automobile accident case to suffice under Pennoyer and 
Fourteenth-Amendment due process). 
109 This conclusion would not appear to be consistent with Judge 
Cardozo’s formulation of a narrow public policy exception in Loucks.  But 
for an example of a West Virginia court reaching such a conclusion on the 
basis of the reverse legal situation, see Paul v. Nat’l Life, 352 S.E.2d 550, 
556 (W. Va. 1986) (refusing to apply an Indiana guest statute on the basis 
of public policy). 
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little relief to the injured plaintiff.  In terms of practical 
effect, the public policy dismissal is a death knell.  The 
plaintiff would be released to take the claim elsewhere, but 
that is cold comfort when there is nowhere else to go. 
Another way of putting this point is that the limited 
scope of the prevailing personal jurisdiction doctrine in the 
early twentieth century meant that there was a very 
practical need for states to be willing to enforce claims based 
on the laws of other states.  Causes of action needed to be 
transitory because they would otherwise not be subject to 
enforcement in many cases.  This strong practical need has 
diminished over time, however.  With the advent of the 
modern “minimum contacts” approach to personal 
jurisdiction,110 the case where a cause of action rejected on 
public policy grounds could not be re-filed in the state whose 
law was refused is increasingly rare.111  Both cases described 
above demonstrate the point.  In Loucks, the decision by 
Standard Oil to send an employee into Massachusetts would 
almost be certain to create a basis for the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction there.  And in the hypothetical guest statute 
case, the defendant’s vehicular misadventures in the state of 
Indiana would certainly be enough to permit the plaintiff’s 
suit to be re-filed there. 
  
B.  Rethinking Discrimination 
 
Since at least 1934, the Supreme Court has 
consistently found that a state may not discriminate against 
federal claims, regardless of whether the discrimination 
                                                          
110 See supra note 97.  
111 Rare, but perhaps not non-existent.  To the contrary, there still 
may from time to time be situations where a dismissal by one state would 
threaten the plaintiff’s ability to bring the action.  See, e.g., Shaffer v. 
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 215 (1977); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 
98 (1978); some cases involving a forum selection clause; renvoi 
situations (where each state would choose the other but invoke public 
policy exception). 
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takes a substantive, procedural, or jurisdictional form.112 In 
Haywood v. Drown, Justice Thomas wrote a lengthy solo 
dissent arguing that this strong antidiscrimination principle 
is misguided.113 According to Thomas, two separate areas of 
the Constitution—the definition of federal judicial power in 
Article III and the Supremacy Clause in Article VI—have 
been relied on to establish the rule applied in cases like 
McKnett, Testa, and Haywood itself.114  But properly 
understood, neither upsets the fundamental sovereign power 
of each state to define for itself which cases its courts will 
hear and decide.115  To the extent that states introduce rules 
in the form of a jurisdictional bar, “it is the end of the matter 
as far as the Constitution is concerned.”116  And that is true 
even if the trigger for the jurisdictional bar is the federal 
nature of the claim. 
Begin then with Article III.  For Thomas, the 
Madisonian Compromise concerns the creation of lower 
federal courts, and does not affect the scope of state power.117  
The power to ordain and establish lower federal courts does 
not imply that state courts are automatically incompetent to 
decide claims arising under federal law, and the decisions 
confirming the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction 
correctly reflect that understanding.118  But it is just as true 
that the power to ordain and establish lower federal courts 
does not imply that state courts are automatically competent 
to decide claims arising under federal law.  That is so for a 
simple reason–state courts are not lower federal courts, and 
                                                          
112 See generally McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 230 
(overturning an Alabama procedural rule that deprived its courts of 
jurisdiction over claims arising in other jurisdictions). 
113 129 S. Ct. 2108, 2131 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“To read the 
Supremacy Clause to include an anti-discrimination principle 
undermines the compromise that shaped Article III and contradicts the 
original understanding of the Constitution.”) 
114 Id. at 2118. 
115 Id. at 2122, 2126. 
116 Id. at 2122. 
117 Id. at 2120. 
118 See, e.g., Claflin v. Houseman, 90 U.S. 130, 136 (1876); Tafflin v. 
Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990). 
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the decision to exercise (or not) the powers created under 
Article III therefore do not reach them.  In short, the 
Madisonian Compromise grants to Congress power to 
develop the lower federal courts, but it leaves in place the 
existing right of states to develop their own courts.119  
Because that latter power includes the power to close courts 
to certain claims, “States have unfettered authority to 
determine whether their local courts may entertain a federal 
cause of action.”120  
Nor is this understanding inconsistent with the 
Supremacy Clause.  The Supremacy Clause requires that 
federal law be applied as a rule of decision when courts 
decide federal claims.121  That is, it provides the authority for 
preemption and serves to “disable state laws that are 
substantively inconsistent with federal law.”122  But the 
Supremacy Clause says nothing about when courts must 
hear federal claims.123  In essence, it is a choice of law rule 
rather than a jurisdictional one.  This does not mean that 
any non-prejudicial dismissal of a federal claim is 
permissible, however.  Once a state extends its normal 
jurisdiction to a federal claim, the state is bound to exercise 
the jurisdiction it provided.  A case-specific decision not to 
hear the federal claim amounts to a disagreement with the 
federal law, and that kind of decision violates supremacy 
principles.124   But so long as a state declines a federal claim 
based on its own jurisdictional rules, the supremacy of 
federal law is not implicated.125  Whether the jurisdictional 
                                                          
119 Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 821 
(1824); Stearns v. United States, 22 F. Cas. 1188, 1192 (1835); Mitchell v. 
Great Works Milling & Mfg. Co., 17 F. Cas. 496, 499 (1843); 1 J. KENT, 
COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 374–375 (1826). 
120 Haywood, 129 S. Ct. at 2122 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
121 Michael G. Collins, Article III Cases, State Court Duties, and the 
Madisonian Compromise, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 39, 144, 178 (1995) 
122 Haywood, 129 S. Ct. at 2124 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
123 Id. at 2123. 
124 Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1, 55 (1912); 
Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 393 (1947). 
125 There is still a significant amount of theoretical difficulty in 
distinguishing jurisdictional rules of the Douglas variety, Douglas v. New 
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rule singles out federal law or discriminates with respect to 
federal claims is beside the point.126 
According to Thomas, this understanding of state 
power changed when the Supreme Court decided McKnett.127  
Unlike Mondou, the state court in McKnett did not have 
subject matter jurisdiction to hear FELA claims.128  On 
Thomas’s understanding, that fact alone should have 
determined the case.  “Alabama had exercised its sovereign 
right to establish the subject-matter jurisdiction of its 
courts,” and “that legislative judgment should have been 
upheld.”129  Instead, the Court imposed an antidiscrimination 
principle and struck down the jurisdictional limitation 
because it was “based solely upon the source of law sought to 
be enforced.”130  After McKnett, the idea that “[a] state may 
not discriminate against rights arising under federal laws” 
became standard fare in cases involving federal claims in 
state courts, even in cases where it was not strictly 
necessary.131  Ultimately, that idea played a central role in 
overruling the New York jurisdictional rule in Haywood.132  
Preserving New York’s sovereign power—as understood by 
Thomas—would have required that the jurisdictional bar be 
                                                                                                                                         
York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 279 U.S. 377, 387–88 (1929), and discretionary 
rules such as the one rejected in Mondou.  Thomas seems to appreciate 
the importance of that conceptual task, arguing extensively that a rule 
should be respected as jurisdictional when it “operate[s] jurisidictionally.”  
Haywood, 129 S. Ct. at 2134–36 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis 
omitted). 
126 This is a point of a distinction between the Supremacy and Full 
Faith and Credit Clauses.  As Thomas notes, the “textual prohibition on 
discrimination” in the Full Faith and Credit Clause actively prohibits 
states from discriminating against sister-state claims.  Haywood, 129 S. 
Ct. at 2125 n.5 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  However, the Supremacy Clause 
simultaneously allows jurisdictional discrimination while it prohibits 
interference with proper disposition according to federal law once 
jurisdiction is accepted.  
127 McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 230 (1934). 
128 Id. at 230. 
129 Haywood, 129 S. Ct. at 2128 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
130 McKnett, 292 U.S. at 233–34. 
131 Id. at 234; see Testa, Howlett, Johnson v. Fankell. 
132 See Haywood, 129 S. Ct. at  2117. 
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upheld, even if it were motivated by hostility to the policies 
embedded in federal law. 
 Toward the end of his Haywood dissent, Thomas also 
suggests a different way of thinking about procedural rules.  
Unlike jurisdictional rules, the Supremacy Clause does 
provide authority for federally created procedures to preempt 
state procedures.133  Once a state decides to open its doors to 
hear a federal claim, it must do so in a way that honors the 
supremacy of federal law.  But procedural preemption should 
not be triggered merely because the use of a state procedure 
would impose a burden on the exercise of a federal right.134  
Thus, the line of cases including Felder that turn on the 
degree of interference with federal claims should be 
eliminated.135  In its place, the Court should employ an 
analysis that focuses on whether a federal procedure was 
created to further particular substantive federal rights.  Such 
procedures should carry over from federal court to state court 
if the federal right to which they are attached is implicated 
in state court.  But procedures lacking a specific connection 
to substantive federal rights or a specific direction regarding 
their applicability in state courts should be understood as 
applicable only in the federal courts.136  A decision to infer 
                                                          
133 See, e.g., Brown v. W. Ry., 338 U.S. 294, 298–99 (1949); Dice v. 
Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R., 342 U.S. 359, 363 (1952); see also 
Martin H. Redish & Steven G. Sklaver, Federal Power to Commandeer 
State Courts:  Implications for the Theory of Judicial Federalism, 32 IND. 
L. REV. 71, 105–108 (1998) (suggesting a strong presumption in favor  
federal procedure, except where such procedure would require a 
“significant attenuation in the structure of the state judicial system”). 
134 Haywood, 129 S. Ct.. at 2133 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he 
Supremacy Clause supplies this Court with no authority to pre-empt a 
state procedural law merely because it ‘burdens the exercise’ of a federal 
right in state court.”). 
135 See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138–141 (1988). 
136 Vicki C. Jackson, Printz and Testa:  The Infrastructure of Federal 
Supremacy, 32 IND. L. REV. 111, 129–30 (1998) (arguing that federal 
procedures “bound up with” the federal right may apply, but that this 
does not necessitate that Congress may impose any procedure on the 
states, which would be an impermissible application of Congress’s 
Necessary and Proper power to the states). 
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preemption with respect to those procedures would be 
“illegitimate—and unconstitutional.”137   
 In sum, Thomas’s view of vertical judicial federalism 
largely de-emphasizes discrimination in favor of a formalistic 
focus on the nature of the rules in question.  When a federal 
claim is filed in state court, the ability of the state court to 
apply its rules rather than federal rules depends on whether 
the rule in question is substantive, procedural, or 
jurisdictional.  If the rule is substantive, the federal rule 
must be applied, at least in cases where the federal law 
preempts competing state laws.  If the rule is procedural, 
then a state should be free to apply its own procedures unless 
Congress provides a specific and valid direction that a 
federally created procedure must be applied.  The fact that 
state and federal procedures differ, or that the application of 
the state procedure will burden the federal right, is not 
enough.  Finally, if the state rule is jurisdictional, the state 
rule may always be applied.  
 
III.   DEVELOPING THE NEW MODEL 
 
The previous Part questioned the factors that motivate 
the Supreme Court’s current approach to questions of judicial 
federalism.  This Part asks what factors should be used 
instead.  Taking cues from Justice Thomas’s dissent in 
Haywood and from earlier decisions, I suggest that the Court 
should focus exclusively on prejudice.  This represents a shift 
in two key respects.  First, discrimination is de-emphasized 
and tolerated.  It is not automatically suspect for a state to 
treat federal or sister state claims differently from local 
claims.  Second, interference is assessed in light of the effect 
of the court’s action on the continuing viability of the claim.  
Dismissals need not meaningfully interfere if they are non-
prejudicial and if an alternative forum is available. 
 
                                                          
137 Haywood, 129 S. Ct. at 2133 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 604 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in the 
judgment)); also need to discuss AT&T v. Concepcion here. 
  
 
 
 Reverse Abstention 36 
A. Vertical Cases 
 
1. Jurisdiction 
 
When a state declines to hear a federal claim based on 
a jurisdictional rule, the dismissal will usually come early in 
the litigation process and be non-prejudicial in nature.  The 
combination of those two factors suggests that dismissals of 
this sort will result in only mild interference with the 
underlying federal rights.  Of course, any dismissal is 
disruptive at some level.  But so long as the dismissal does 
not infringe on the ability of the parties to pursue the claim 
elsewhere, that disruption should not be considered to rise to 
the level of constitutional concern.  And this should be true 
even if the jurisdictional rule applies only to, or primarily to, 
federal claims.  
Previous decisions involving vertical judicial 
federalism have not been sensitive to the practical effect of 
dismissal on the federal rights involved.  Instead, the Court’s 
approach has been formalistic, and has viewed any refusal to 
hear a federal claim as an impermissible form of interference 
with federal law.138 But Justice Thomas was onto something 
in Haywood when he noted that “because the dismissal . . . is 
for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, it has no preclusive 
effect on claims refiled in federal court and thus does not 
alter the substance of the federal claim.”139  This goes beyond 
a mere claim that under an original understanding of the 
                                                          
138 See supra notes 23–29 and accompanying text.  In this sense, 
these cases are kindred spirits with other recent decisions by the Court 
that have been characterized as formalistic.  See, e.g., Stern v. Marshall, 
131 S.Ct. 2594 (2011); Erwin Chemerinsky, Formalism Without a 
Foundation: Stern v. Marshall, __ SUP. CT. REV. __ (forthcoming 2012); 
Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 
3138 (2010); Kent Barnett, Avoiding Independent Agency Armageddon, 
87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2012)(characterizing Free 
Enterprise Fund as a “foray into formalism”). 
139 Haywood, 129 S. Ct. at 2132 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations 
omitted); see also Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 160 (1988) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting) (“Every plaintiff has the option of proceeding in federal court, 
and the Wisconsin statute has not the slightest effect on that right.”). 
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Supremacy Clause, the definition of jurisdiction remains 
within the sovereign power of the states.  Instead, it is a 
functional argument about the extent of interference that 
results from state action with respect to federal claims.   
Under this sort of functional inquiry, whether 
prejudice attaches to a state court dismissal becomes 
crucially important.  If a state chooses to structure a 
jurisdictional dismissal as a final decision on the merits, then 
the dismissal has dramatic effects for the ability of the 
parties to pursue the claim elsewhere.  This is a decision that 
cannot be countenanced under the Supremacy Clause.  Even 
though the dismissal is jurisdictional in a formal sense, the 
result demonstrates hostility to federal law.  In essence, the 
state is applying some other body of law to the merits of the 
claim—namely, the state’s jurisdictional law that becomes a 
basis for the prejudicial action.  To apply some other law 
besides federal law to determine the merits of a federal claim 
is impermissible under any theory of vertical judicial 
federalism.  
But when a state court dismisses a federal claim 
without prejudice, as in Haywood, the dismissal “does not 
alter the substance of the federal claim” because a federal 
forum will almost always be available to hear the claim after 
dismissal.140  This is true for two reasons.  First, as a matter 
of personal jurisdiction, the federal courts track the personal 
jurisdiction of the states in which they sit.141  Therefore, if 
personal jurisdiction was proper in the state court that issues 
the dismissal, it will also be proper in a federal court within 
the same state.  Second, as a matter of subject matter 
jurisdiction, the dismissal of a claim that raises a federal 
question will permit re-filing in federal court under the 
jurisdictional grant in 28 U.S.C. § 1331.142 In Haywood, 
Justice Thomas rightly emphasized that “Congress has 
created inferior federal courts that have the power to 
adjudicate all § 1983 claims” as part of his conclusion that 
                                                          
140 Haywood, 129 S. Ct. at 2132. 
141 FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A).   
142 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006). 
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the “substance of the federal claim” would not be altered by a 
state court dismissal.143  Because of concurrent personal 
jurisdiction and the availability of general federal question 
jurisdiction, non-prejudicial dismissals by a state court will 
generally affect only the location of the suit, but not the 
substance of the claim.  While the jurisdictional rule might 
reflect hostility to the federal claim, it does not result in 
hostile action with respect to federal law.144 
That may not always be true, however.  In limited 
situations, a dismissal that is non-prejudicial in form may 
nevertheless result in meaningful interference.  One example 
of this is when federal law is presented as a defense to a 
state-law claim.  Clearly, if the state court simply ignored the 
federal defense or refused to apply it, the result would be 
constitutionally problematic.145  But could the state court 
decline jurisdiction over the entire claim based on the 
presence of the federal defense?  The answer here should be 
no, for the reason that such a dismissal would seriously 
impair the status of the suit.  The parties would not be 
permitted to re-file the case in federal court because the 
presence of the federal defense would not be sufficient to 
trigger the availability of federal jurisdiction under a basic 
application of the principle established in Mottley.146  A 
second, and far less common, example would occur if 
Congress created exclusive jurisdiction over federal claims in 
the state courts. In that situation, a state court dismissal, 
even if non-prejudicial in form, would be prejudicial in effect, 
and that effect would be enough to trigger constitutional 
concerns.  In a case decided just this term, Justice Ginsburg 
                                                          
143 Haywood, 129 S. Ct. at 2132.   
144 See id. at 2131 (“Resolving a federal claim with preclusive effect 
based on a state-law defense is far different from simply closing the door 
of the state courthouse to that federal claim.”). 
145 Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 160 (1932). 
146 Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908).  
Perhaps it may be argued that this result would not offend any federal 
interest because a dismissal would not grant any recovery in the face of a 
potential federal defense. In other words, it is the plaintiff here, who is 
asserting state rights, whose claim is hindered by the state court’s 
decision. 
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emphasized that congressional intent to divest the federal 
courts of jurisdiction must be clear, and that an affirmative 
grant of jurisdiction to the state courts is not sufficient.147 
While conceptually interesting, this is an empty set of cases, 
and is likely to remain so.   
 
2. Procedure 
   
 The current Supreme Court doctrine recognizes that 
the application of state procedures may in certain 
circumstances result in interference with federal interests.148  
In cases where such interference would result, the Court has 
concluded that the federal procedures are supreme and that 
state courts have an obligation to apply them.  There are 
essentially two categories of cases here.  First, the federal 
law might specifically define procedures that are associated 
with substantive federal rights.149  Second, the federal law 
might say nothing about the procedures that should be 
applied, but the Court may nevertheless conclude that the 
regularly applicable federal procedures are in some sense 
                                                          
147 See Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, __ S.Ct. __, 2012 WL 125429 
(Jan. 18, 2012). 
148 See supra Part I.A. 
149 See, e.g., Cent. Vt. Ry. v. White, 238 U.S. 507, 512 (1915) 
(requiring defendants to carry the burden of proof for contributory 
negligence under FELA, contrary to the Vermont rule); Dice v. Akron, 
Canton & Youngstown R.R., 342 U.S. 359, 363 (1952) (finding that the 
“right to trial by jury is too substantial a part of the rights accorded by 
[FELA] to permit it to be classified as a mere ‘local rule of procedure’ for 
denial [by the states]”).  As Anthony Bellia has noted, these procedures 
are not explicitly contained in FELA but have been implied as a matter of 
statutory construction.  Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Federal Regulation of 
State Court Procedures, 110 YALE L.J. 947, 959 (2001).  Thus the line 
between express, Congressional-mandated procedure accompanying a 
federal right and procedures intertwined with federal rights may be a bit 
blurry.  In any case, express federal procedures would likely preempt 
state procedures without much fuss.  See Kevin M. Clermont, Reverse-
Erie, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 20 (2006) (noting the clear preemption 
where Congress “expressly…ma[kes] federal law applicable in state 
court”). 
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essential to the vindication of the federal substantive 
interest.150   
 There is a similarity here to the standard Erie context, 
where federal courts are directed by the Rules of Decision 
Act151 to apply state rules of decision, which can sometimes 
include state procedural rules that are related to the 
definition of state substantive rights.152  But of course, under 
Hanna federal procedural rules supported by the Rules 
Enabling Act153 may be applied if found to be on point and 
valid,154 even when the result is to displace a state rule that 
is at least partially substantive in nature.155  And state 
procedural rules that are not clearly substantive in nature, 
but that may nevertheless affect the outcome of litigation, 
may in certain instances be disregarded in favor of federal 
rules if the competing federal interest in defining its own 
                                                          
150 See, e.g., Brown v. W. Ry. of Ala., 338 U.S. 294, 298–99 (1949) 
(requiring states to apply more liberal federal pleading standards, as 
opposed to stricter local rules, in FELA actions); but see Johnson v. 
Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 915 (1997) (refusing to require states to allow 
interlocutory appeals upon denial of qualified immunity under §1983).  
Even the absence of a certain defense in federal court can lead to 
disallowing such a defense in a state court hearing a federal claim.  
Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990) (refusing to allow a Florida school 
board to assert a state sovereign immunity defense).   
In a related vein, a state law may act as an obstacle to vindication of 
the federal right, regardless of the existence of a regularly applicable, 
conflicting federal procedure.  See, e.g., Russell v. CSX Trans., 689 So.2d 
1354, 1358 (La. 1997) (finding state forum non conveniens law 
discriminatory in a FELA case); Bunch v. Robinson, 712 A.2d 585, 588–89 
(Md. App. 1998) (finding state common-law immunity defense 
discriminatory in an FLSA case), rev’d on other grounds, 788 A.2d 636 
(Md. 2002). 
151 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006). 
152 Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op, Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 535 
(1958) (concluding that federal courts must apply state rules if those 
rules are “bound up” with the state-created substantive right). 
153 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006). 
154 See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 464 (1965). 
155 See, e.g., Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 7 
(1987) (overturning a state mandatory affirmance penalty statute in 
favor of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38). 
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procedures is sufficiently great.156 States have no parallel 
mechanisms that would permit them to deny the 
enforcement of federal procedures that the Supreme Court 
defines as essential to the vindication of federal rights.157  As 
a result, the burdens imposed by the reverse Erie cases are 
potentially much greater.  When combined with the cases 
that require state courts to take jurisdiction over federal 
claims, a state court may find itself forced to hear a federal 
claim and to apply burdensome federal procedures.   
 In Haywood, Justice Thomas proposed to reduce these 
burdens by requiring express preemption of state procedures 
before a federal procedure would become binding in state 
court—in other words, by eliminating the second category of 
cases described above.  I am generally sympathetic to the 
impulse to acknowledge the burdens that may be imposed by 
federal procedures that attend a federal claim.  But the 
model that he proposes presents thorny characterization 
problems because the scope of the state’s power is directly 
sensitive to whether a particular rule is jurisdictional, 
procedural, or substantive.158 
                                                          
156 See Gasperini v. Ctr. For Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 438 
(1996). 
157 Not only do states lack any parallel refusal power, it would not be 
overstating the obvious to note that the Supremacy Clause forces federal 
procedure into the state courts far more pervasively than state procedure 
makes its way into federal courts via Erie analysis.   Kevin M. Clermont, 
Reverse-Erie, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 40 (2006). 
158 This question is not easy to answer, and is generally associated 
with unforeseen baggage.  See Scott Dodson, In Search of Removal 
Jurisdiction, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 55, 66 (2008) (creating a four-factor 
analysis for determining whether a rule is procedural or jurisdictional);  
Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction, Merits, and Procedure:  Thoughts 
on a Trichotomy, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1547, 1553 (2008) (noting the 
importance of characterization as a merits rule, which cannot be applied 
until jurisdictional or procedural questions are resolved);  Karen 
Petroski, Statutory Genres:  Substance, Procedure, Jurisdiction at 67 
(2012) (draft under submission) (concluding that the jurisdictional-
characterization doctrines are better developed and more function-
oriented than the substance-procedure dichotomy of Erie fame); Bowles v. 
Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 210 (2007) (describing some of the consequences of 
characterization as either a “claims-processing” or “jurisdictional” rule); 
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 A different way to reduce these burdens would be to 
expand the state court’s ability to refuse jurisdiction over a 
federal claim when that claim carries with it a set of federal 
procedures that the states cannot easily implement.159  This 
would equalize the treatment of dismissals rooted in 
jurisdiction and procedure.  As with the pure jurisdictional 
decisions discussed in the previous section, the state court 
must ensure that a federal court is available to hear the 
claim once dismissed, and must structure the dismissal so 
that it produces no prejudice to the federal rights involved. 
Moreover, the state court should ensure that any dismissal 
occurs early in the litigation process.  Unlike questions 
relating to subject matter jurisdiction, procedural issues may 
not naturally arise in the course of litigation until significant 
time and resources have been expended.  At some point, the 
disruption and delay stemming from a dismissal based on the 
difficulty of applying federal procedural rules may be 
effectively prejudicial to the legal rights of the parties.  State 
courts should therefore consider the procedural difficulties 
presented by the presence of a federal claim when the case is 
filed, and should reach decisions relating to abstention 
promptly. 
 
B. Horizontal Cases 
 
1. Dismissals 
  
As discussed in Part II, the public policy exception was 
traditionally conceived as both narrow and jurisdictional.  
Thus understood, it is not a part of the choice of law process.  
That is, public policy is not a factor that contributes to the 
                                                                                                                                         
Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514–15 (2006) (concluding that 
Congress could have, but did not, characterize the employee-numerosity 
requirement of Title VII as jurisdictional).  
159 Wendy Parmet makes a similar argument when she points out 
that Congressional “federalization” of state procedure can carry with it 
“heavy burdens” for state courts.  Wendy E. Parmet, Stealth Preemption: 
The Proposed Federalization of State Court Procedures, 44 VILLANOVA L. 
REV. 1, 15 (1999). 
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choice of a particular law to be applied, but is considered only 
after that initial choice had been made.  The question asked 
in cases like Loucks is whether the law selected through the 
traditional choice of law process should be enforced by the 
forum.  But precisely because the selection has already 
occurred, the potential answers to that question are limited.  
A court may decide to apply the law, or it may decide not to.  
Even in that latter circumstance, the court’s determination of 
what law should be applied to the claim is unaffected.  
Instead, the conclusion is that the claim is still governed by 
the selected law, but that the forum court should not or 
cannot be the one to apply it.  
Understood this way, it is difficult to sustain a 
distinction between the public policy exception and rules like 
those at issue in Hughes.  The difference that appears 
implicit in the way that the contexts have been treated is 
that Hughes involves a post-choice of law decision to refuse 
enforcement of a sister-state law, while the public policy 
exception operates within the choice of law process itself.  
Because the Court is unwilling to delve into the particulars 
of a state’s choice of law methodology, the public policy 
exception escapes scrutiny.160  But the public policy analysis 
performed in cases like Loucks takes place after the 
traditional jurisdiction-selection has been completed, and it 
is therefore an error to treat it as part of the selection itself.  
If the exception is triggered, it operates to override the choice 
of law produced by the system that the state has adopted, 
and it does so precisely based on a public policy in the state 
that demands that result.  In that sense, it is no different 
from the rule at issue in Hughes, which was read to create a 
public policy that required the refusal of a sister state law.161  
                                                          
160 Louise Weinberg, Choice of Law and Minimal Scrutiny, 49 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 440, 448 (1982) (arguing that the Court’s choice of law analysis in 
horizontal contexts, such as Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, requires only a 
“minimum of fairness and reasonableness” which “will always be assured 
by a process that weeds out the arbitrary and unreasonable”). 
161 Of course, the rule at issue in Hughes was statutory and 
categorical, while the public policy exception is invoked by judges on a 
case-by-case basis.  It is difficult to see why the distinction in terms of the 
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From the standpoint of discrimination, both results are 
equally offensive.162 
What does distinguish Loucks and Hughes is the 
nature of the resulting dismissal.  To be clear, Loucks itself 
did not result in a dismissal at all.  But the formulation 
developed by Cardozo would result in a jurisdictional 
dismissal if the court had concluded that the foreign law 
violated local public policy.163  On the other hand, the 
Wisconsin court in Hughes not only refused to apply the 
competing law of Illinois, but read the statute to require a 
dismissal of the claim on the merits. The public policy 
dismissal is disruptive and inconvenient, to be sure.  But no 
prejudicial action is taken, and the plaintiff may seek an 
alternative venue in which to press the claim.  Moreover, 
because of the increased flexibility in the law of personal 
jurisdiction, an alternative venue is almost certainly 
available.164  In Hughes, on the other hand, the dismissal is 
prejudicial, and efforts to revive the claim in an alternative 
                                                                                                                                         
source of the rule should matter.  In other contexts, the Court has 
rejected attempts to introduce distinctions based on whether a state’s 
action takes the form of statute or common-law activity.  But the 
difference between a categorical rule and a discretionary one is relevant.  
See Scott Dodson, Mandatory Rules, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1, 9 (2008) (arguing 
that the real question in the jurisdictional characterization inquiry 
should be whether the rule is mandatory because such a categorization 
carries with it important litigation consequences). 
162 This is Larry Kramer’s point, and to the extent his argument is 
based on a claim that both are discriminatory, I agree.  See Larry 
Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional 
Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 1998 (1997). 
163 See, e.g., Ciampittiello v. Campitello, 54 A.2d 669, 671 (Conn. 
1947) (finding in a case involving a horse-race betting contract that “the 
claim here presented, although valid under the law of another 
jurisdiction, contravenes the ancient and deep-rooted public policy of this 
state and therefore cannot be enforced in our courts”); Republic of Iraq v. 
First Nat’l City Bank, 241 F. Supp. 567, 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (dismissing 
a foreign plaintiff’s claim to recover confiscated goods as offensive to New 
York public policy).  Note that the decision in First National might be 
more prejudicial than Ciampittiello—the foreign plaintiff would likely be 
just as unsuccessful in trying to obtain and then enforce a foreign 
judgment in New York. 
164 See supra notes 97, 110–111 and accompanying text. 
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forum would be unsuccessful.165  From the standpoint of 
interference, then, the two cases are very different.   
In Hughes itself, Justice Black noted but did not 
emphasize the prejudicial nature of the dismissal.166  But 
that fact should properly be viewed as central to the result.  
To dismiss a claim on the merits because it is based on the 
law of a sister state is a result that is fundamentally 
inconsistent with any concept of full faith and credit, even 
one focused primarily on undue interference.  The prejudice 
that attaches to the resulting judgment creates a virtually 
insurmountable barrier to vindicating the claim.  Had the 
rule in Hughes been applied to refuse the claim altogether, 
however, the analysis should be different.  In that case, the 
legitimate interests of the state in structuring the way that it 
devotes resources to claims pursued within its court system 
are implicated.  These are the procedural interests urged by 
Justice Frankfurter in his Hughes dissent.167 But even if 
Frankfurter’s discussion of the state’s interests is persuasive, 
his conclusion is misguided.  A state should be permitted to 
further its procedural interests in structuring its judicial 
processes only when doing so does not significantly interfere 
with the substantive rights of a sister state.  A prejudicial 
dismissal never passes that test; a non-prejudicial dismissal 
might.168 
                                                          
165 An alternative forum would not have power to deny the Wisconsin 
judgment full faith and credit based on its assessment that the policy 
embedded in the judgment was undesirable.  Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 
522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998); Morris v. Jones, 329 U.S. 545, 551 (1947); Roche 
v. McDonald, 275 U.S. 449, 452 (1928). 
166 See Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 613 (1951).  Black’s ignorance 
(genuine or intended) of the serious topic of prejudice is part of what 
makes the opinion difficult to understand.   
167 See id. at 618–19 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
168 It is difficult to be categorical about the acceptability of a non-
prejudicial dismissal because there may be circumstances where such a 
dismissal will have practical effects beyond necessitating a change of 
venue.  Indeed, a court applying the exception in this manner should be 
required to think in those terms.  See infra note 171 and accompanying 
text. 
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None of this means that the use of a public policy 
exception is always acceptable.  Instead, the argument 
presented here supports only a narrower assertion that the 
public policy exception as articulated in Loucks is not 
categorically objectionable, at least not on an interference-
based theory of full faith and credit.  This distinction is 
important because the public policy exception is not always 
applied consistently with the Loucks formulation.  Courts 
frequently use the exception not as a basis for dismissal, but 
as a basis for substituting and applying the forum law.169  
When it takes this form, the public policy exception is very 
close to Hughes because it results in a prejudicial action with 
respect to the claim.  By definition, the forum law is different 
from the foreign law that would otherwise be selected 
through traditional choice of law rules, and the difference is 
a significant one.170  To apply the forum law, and to 
ultimately decide the claim on the merits, thus displaces the 
foreign law entirely and precludes its enforcement elsewhere.  
The first step of the analysis under a prejudice-based theory 
of full faith and credit must be that if a state refuses to apply 
the law of a sister state on the grounds that it is foreign, the 
                                                          
169 See, e.g., Farmers’ & Merchs.’ Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 250 N.W. 
214, 219–220 (Iowa 1933) (finding Texas law unjust but seemingly 
dismissing on the merits by concluding “the petition does not state a 
cause of action against the defendants”); Owen v. Owen, 444 N.W.2d 710, 
713 (S.D. 1989) (applying South Dakota guest statute because Indiana’s 
law was offensive forum public policy); See DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 
793 S.W.2d 670. 678–79 (Tex. 1990) (holding that Texas law applied to a 
contract dispute notwithstanding terms that expressly designated chose 
Florida law as governing).  Paulsen and Sovern also recognized the 
harmful effects of widespread merits-level dismissals based on public 
policy, finding that few cases actually upheld the principle that public 
policy dismissals left other states, lacking the policy scruples of the 
forum, open for the plaintiff to pursue his claim.  Monrad G. Paulsen & 
Michael I. Sovern, “Public Policy” in the Conflict of Laws, 56 COLUM. L. 
REV. 969, 1010–11  (1956). 
170 Courts invoke the exception on the basis of policy differences that 
are much less fundamental than those imagined by Cardozo in Loucks, 
see, e.g., Ciampittiello v. Campitello, 54 A.2d 669, 671 (Conn. 1947) 
(barring a case involving horse-race betting), but to trigger the exception, 
the difference must be significant.   
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refusal to do so must take a non-prejudicial form.  As with 
Hughes, this form of a public policy exception does not 
survive that first step.  
Refusals that do survive that first step should not 
always be viewed as permissible, however.  Instead, a 
decision to refuse a claim rooted in the law of another state, 
even when structured as a non-prejudicial dismissal, should 
be permitted only if the dismissal will not unduly interfere 
with the claim.  Undue interference means something other 
than the inconvenience of having to re-file in an alternative 
forum.  Rather, courts should do something along the lines of 
what is done in the context of a forum non conveniens 
analysis.  There, a court must convince itself that a 
competent alternative forum is available to hear the claim 
before it dismisses the claim.171  The same should be true 
here.  The primary barrier to the availability of an 
alternative forum will be personal jurisdiction in the courts 
of a sister state, and courts should ensure that personal 
jurisdiction may be sustained there, either through a 
minimum contacts and long arm analysis or through consent 
of the defendant.  One of the implications of this requirement 
is that a categorical rule barring a claim rooted in sister state 
law will be suspect.  Courts must have the discretion to hear 
the claim if necessary to support the interstate system of 
justice.  But if a state court concludes that it is unwilling to 
apply the law of a sister state, and if in response to that 
conclusion it dismisses the claim without prejudice after 
assuring that the courts of a sister state are competent to 
                                                          
171 Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 n.22 (1981); see also 
Joel H. Samuels, When is An Alternative Forum Available?  Rethinking 
the Forum Non Conveniens Analysis, 85 IND. L.J. 1059, 1081–82 (2010) 
(arguing that forum non conveniens is a useful doctrine, but that courts 
impermissibly downplay the importance of whether another forum can 
and will hear a claim before dismissing for forum non conveniens); but 
see Margaret G. Stewart, Forum Non Conveniens:  A Doctrine in Search 
of  a Role, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1259, 1263–65 (1986) (arguing that 
jurisdictional doctrines can and should subsume the functions of forum 
non conveniens, thus eliminating it entirely). 
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hear it, the interstate system should be willing to tolerate 
that result.     
 
2. Defenses 
 
A second implication of a focus on interference is that 
states should not be permitted to reject the application of a 
defense on the grounds that it is foreign.  The distinction 
between claims and defenses was first articulated by Justice 
Brandeis in Bradford Electric Co. v. Clapper.172  There, in a 
worker’s compensation action, a federal court sitting in 
diversity chose to apply the law of New Hampshire, where 
the death being sued on occurred, rather than the law of 
Vermont, where all relevant parties were from.173  The 
Supreme Court rejected that choice, and Brandeis explained 
the problem this way: 
 
But the company is in a position different from that of a 
plaintiff who seeks to enforce a cause of action conferred 
by the laws of another state.  The right which it claims 
should be given effect is set up by way of defense to an 
asserted liability; and to a defense different 
considerations apply.  A state may, on occasion, decline to 
enforce a foreign cause of action.  In so doing, it merely 
denies a remedy, leaving unimpaired the plaintiff’s 
substantive right, so that he is free to enforce it 
elsewhere.  But to refuse to give effect to a substantive 
defense under the applicable law of another state . . . 
subjects the defendant to irremediable liability.  This may 
not be done.174 
 
Clapper has generally fallen out of favor, largely because it 
was decided in a period when the Supreme Court took the 
constraints imposed by the constitution on the choice of law 
process more seriously than it does today.175  Brandeis’s 
                                                          
172 236 U.S. 145 (1932). 
173 Id. at 151. 
174 Id. at 160. 
175 See id. at 161 (comparing interests of states); Alaska Packers 
Ass’n v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 294 U.S. 532, 547–50 (1935) (giving 
great deference to the rights of states to apply their own laws in their 
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conclusion that full faith and credit principles required the 
application of Vermont law is not consistent with the 
constitutional choice of law principles established by more 
modern cases.176  But from the standpoint of interference, the 
distinction between claims and defenses remains a sensible 
and useful one. As discussed in the previous section, a 
refusal to decide a sister state claim might be discriminatory 
in some sense, but it will rarely result in meaningful 
interference with state-created rights.177  Put differently, 
refusing a claim is non-prejudicial, at least when there is an 
alternative forum available to decide the claim.   
But refusing a defense is quite different.  Consider 
Paul v. National Life.178  Suit was filed in West Virginia 
based on a fatal car accident that killed two West Virginia 
residents in Indiana.179  Application of the traditional choice 
of law approach led to the selection of Indiana law, which 
included a guest statute that limited recovery by guests 
against their hosts.180  When that decision was appealed, the 
state supreme court firmly rejected the suggestion that it 
                                                                                                                                         
own courts and not finding Alaska’s interest “superior” such that it need 
be applied in place of California law); Pacific Emp’rs Ins. Co. v. Indus. 
Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493, 501 (1939) (“To the extent that 
California is required to give full faith and credit to the conflicting 
Massachusetts statute it must be denied the right to apply in its own 
courts its own statute, constitutionally enacted in pursuance of its policy 
to provide compensation for employees injured in their employment 
within the state. It must withhold the remedy given by its own statute to 
its residents by way of compensation for medical, hospital and nursing 
services rendered to the injured employee, and it must remit him to 
Massachusetts to secure the administrative remedy which that state has 
provided. We cannot say that the full faith and credit clause goes so far.” 
176 See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312 (1981) (requiring 
only that a “State must have a significant contact or significant 
aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its 
law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair”); see also Phillips 
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985) (noting that Allstate 
recognized only “modest restrictions on the application of forum law” 
under full faith and credit). 
177 See supra Part III.B.1. 
178 Paul v. National Life, 352 S.E.2d 550 (W. Va. 1986). 
179 Id. at 550. 
180 Id. at 550–51. 
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should reconsider its devotion to the traditional choice of law 
regime.181  That portion of the opinion, which contains many 
memorable and pithy turns of phrase, has earned the case a 
place in many conflict of laws casebooks. But Paul is also an 
example of a modern use of the public policy exception.  At 
the end of the opinion, the court found that guest statutes 
violate the public policy of West Virginia, and therefore 
concluded that “we will no longer enforce the automobile 
guest passenger statutes of foreign jurisdictions in our 
courts.”182  But the court did not follow that statement with a 
jurisdictional dismissal of the claim under review, and 
instead remanded the case “for further proceedings not 
inconsistent with this opinion.”183  
Precisely what those proceedings would look like is 
somewhat unclear.  One possibility is that the application of 
the public policy doctrine would require dismissal of the suit, 
in accordance with cases like Loucks.  But that result could 
have been achieved by the supreme court directly; further 
proceedings would not have been required.  A second 
possibility is that the application of the public policy doctrine 
would lead to the substitution of West Virginia law.  That 
application of the public policy doctrine would be problematic 
for the reasons described in the prior section.184  A final 
possibility is that the application of the public policy doctrine 
would lead to the continued application of Indiana law, but 
without the availability of the guest statute.  This third 
option runs afoul of Clapper.  At one level, it might be viewed 
as more respectful to Indiana to continue to apply as much of 
that state’s law as is consistent with West Virginia’s public 
policy.  But Indiana’s guest statute acts as a partial 
immunity to liability that can be set up as a defense in cases 
where something less than willfulness is proven.  For West 
Virginia to ignore that defense results in a prejudicial—or, to 
                                                          
181 Id. at 556 (“Having mastered marble, we decline an apprenticeship 
in bronze. We therefore reaffirm our adherence to the doctrine of lex loci 
delicti today.”). 
182 Paul, 352 S.E.2d at 556. 
183 Id. 
184 See supra notes 169–170 and accompanying text. 
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use Brandeis’s term, “irremediable”—determination of the 
claim that directly interferes with legal rights established by 
Indiana.  To apply something less than all of Indiana’s law is 
in some sense not to apply to Indiana’s law at all.  West 
Virginia may choose to apply Indiana’s law, or it may choose 
not to.  It should not be free, however, to apply Indiana’s law 
selectively.185   
 
IV.  JUSTIFYING THE NEW MODEL 
 
A. Trust 
 
If adopted, the model developed in Part III would 
increase the authority of state courts.  The contemplated 
increase is not unconstrained:  state courts would always be 
required to ensure that their actions do not result in 
prejudice to the legal claims presented to them.  But it is an 
increase nonetheless.  For that reason, the model is bound to 
trigger anxieties among those who harbor a deep and abiding 
distrust of state courts.   
Such distrust is an established pastime, and one that 
is particularly salient in the context of vertical federalism.186  
                                                          
185 In Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, 
upheld the minimalist approach to evaluating states’ choice of law 
doctrines.  486 U.S. 717, 730 (1988).  There, he noted that Kansas 
properly applied the laws of other states, in compliance with the Court’s 
Shutts ruling.  Id.  Solidifying the Court’s hands-off attitude to state 
choice of law, he concluded that a state cannot violate full faith and credit 
or due process by simple misconstruction of a sister state’s law.  Id. at 
730–31.  Rather, “the misconstruction must contradict law of the other 
State that is clearly established and that has been brought to the court's 
attention” for it to raise constitutional concerns.  Id. at 731.  From the 
perspective of Paul, a decision by West Virginia to apply an Indiana claim 
but not an Indiana defense might qualify as a judgment that reflects just 
such a contradiction of clearly-established law. 
186 While the trust argument has been invoked most frequently in the 
context of vertical federalism, some of the underlying claims apply with 
equal force in the horizontal context.  Admittedly, not all of the claims 
translate.  For example, although judicial selection mechanisms vary 
from state to state, the protections accorded Article III judges in the 
federal system are unique, and the institutional advantages that flow 
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The Supreme Court itself has never directly questioned the 
ability of state courts to handle federal business,187 but 
academic commentators have not been so shy.  Most 
famously, Burt Neuborne argued in 1977 that federal courts 
are “institutionally preferable to state appellate courts as 
                                                                                                                                         
from those protections are similarly unique.  But the argument that state 
judges will be unfamiliar with federal law and will therefore be less 
competent to interpret and apply that law retains force when a state 
applies the law of another state.  Perhaps competing state laws are more 
familiar than federal law, but certainly both are outside the domain of 
the court’s natural expertise.  Indeed, the competence concerns may be 
even greater in the horizontal context because there is less opportunity 
for error correction.  When a state court mistakenly applies federal law, 
that decision is subject to review and correction by the United States 
Supreme Court.  But when a court in State X mistakenly applies the law 
of State Y, the availability of review is much weaker.  Certainly the 
decision may not be collaterally reviewed by the only courts not subject to 
disadvantages associated with lack of familiarity: those of State Y.  
Instead, State Y is bound by the judgment issued by State X, even if it 
rests on a misapplication of State Y law.  See, e.g., Fauntleroy v. Lum, 
210 U.S. 230, 237 (1908) (“Whether the award would or would not have 
been conclusive, and whether the ruling of the Missouri court upon that 
matter was right or wrong, there can be no question that the judgment 
was conclusive in Missouri on the validity of the cause of action.”); MGM 
Desert Inn, Inc. v. Holz, 411 S.E.2d 399, 402–03 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991) 
(upholding Nevada judgment related to gaming debt notwithstanding 
North Carolina anti-gambling statute that would prevent enforcement of 
the debt in its courts in the first instance).  On the other hand, the 
United States Supreme Court is empowered to review the decision on the 
grounds that State X’s decision failed to give full faith and credit to the 
law of State Y.  But the standard of review in those cases is exceedingly 
weak.  See supra note 185.  And even if the Supreme Court were entitled 
to do more, there is no reason to think that it would not suffer from the 
same competence deficiencies as did the State X courts. 
187 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493–94 n.35 (1976); Haywood v. 
Drown, 129 S. Ct. 2018, 2114 (2009); Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 367–
68 (1990)).  But on at least one occasion, the Court has been charged with 
questioning state courts indirectly.  See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 
479, 499 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (chiding the majority for their 
“unarticulated assumption that state courts will not be as prone as 
federal courts to vindicate constitutional rights promptly and 
effectively”).  
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forums in which to raise federal constitutional claims.”188  
That assertion rested on a set of three claims about the 
comparative advantages of federal judges as arbiters of 
federal rights:  (1) that federal judges have superior technical 
competence in dealing with federal rights, (2) that federal 
judges are psychologically more open to federal claims, and 
(3) that federal judges are insulated from majoritarian 
pressures that might constrain the enforcement of federal 
rights.189 Although not universally accepted,190 these claims 
quickly became commonplace in the academic literature and 
have remained so ever since.191 
That said, the standard trust-based criticisms have 
increasingly come under attack in recent years.  Twenty 
years ago, Erwin Chemerinsky noted that Neuborne’s 
contention that federal judges would be more solicitous of 
federal rights claims, or at least particular federal rights 
claims, might be related to the domination of federal courts 
by Democratic appointees.192  If so, then the shifting 
composition of federal courts toward Republican appointees 
                                                          
188 Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1116 
(1977). 
189 Id. at 1120–21. 
190 William B. Rubenstein, The Myth of Superiority, 16 CONST. 
COMMENT. 599, 600 (1999); Michelle T. Friedland, Disqualification or 
Suppression:  Due Process and the Response to Judicial Campaign 
Speech, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 563, 621, 629–30 (2004); Frederic M. Bloom,  
State Courts Unbound, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 501, 550–51 (2008); see also 
Brett Christopher Gerry, Parity Revisited:  An Empirical Comparison of 
State and Lower Federal Court Interpretations of Nollan v. California 
Coastal Commission, 23 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 233, 257–58 (1999) 
(attempting an empirical comparison of state and federal treatment of 
constitutional questions, showing that there is little meaningful 
difference). 
191 Justin F. Marceau, The Fourth Amendment at a Three-Way Stop, 
62 ALA. L. REV. 687, 715 n.129 (2011); Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism 
in Action:  FDA Regulatory Preemption in Pharmaceutical Cases in State 
Versus Federal Courts, 15 J.L. & POL'Y 1013, 1045–46 (2007) (foreseeing 
discrepancies based on state-court distaste for federal regulatory 
agencies); Burt Neuborne, Parity Revisited:  The Uses of a Judicial 
Forum of Excellence, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 797, 799 (1995). 
192 Erwin Chemerinsky, Ending the Parity Debate, 71 B.U. L. REV. 
593, 599 (1991). 
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“diminishes any basis for greater trust in federal courts.”193 A 
few years later, William Rubenstein went a step further, 
suggesting that—at least in the context of modern gay-rights 
litigation—federal courts were increasingly being viewed as 
less trustworthy venues than their state counterparts.194  
Others have since broadened and refined Rubenstein’s 
argument; while some federal claims may be similar to the 
gay rights account, others are likely to benefit from the same 
compositional changes.195  The larger thrust of these 
arguments is that the parity debate is not about trust at all, 
at least not entirely so.  Instead, claims of parity or its 
absence often serve to “disguise the expression of nakedly 
ideological preferences.”196  As a result, the degree to which 
we are bothered by an increase in the authority of state 
                                                          
193 Id.; see also Edward Purcell, Reconsidering the Frankfurterian 
Paradigm:  Reflections on Histories of Lower Federal Courts, 24 LAW & 
SOC. INQUIRY 679, 712 (1999) (“[I]n spite of the continued salience of local 
pressures and partisan politics, federal judges ten[d] increasingly to be 
drawn from the upper echelons of the bar with more pronounced national 
orientations and stronger commitments to professionally defined norms 
of law and judicial behavior.”). Even Professor Neuborne conceded that 
these compositional changes affect the relative advantage provided by a 
federal forum.  Burt Neuborne, Parity Revisited:  The Uses of  a Judicial 
Forum of Excellence, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 797, 798–99 (1995).   
194 William B. Rubenstein, The Myth of Superiority, 16 CONST. 
COMMENT. 599, 606–11 (1999) (recounting the shift toward state courts in 
gay rights litigation).  Part of Rubenstein’s explanation for that 
phenomenon was context-specific:  state judges had particular expertise 
in family law issues that made them more sympathetic to the claims 
being presented.  Id. at 612–14.  But part of the argument was structural 
and compositional, and rested on the assertion that the majoritarian 
pressures felt by state judges may in certain circumstances lead them to 
be more sympathetic to rights-based claims than the insulated—and 
increasingly conservative—judges populating our federal courthouses.  
Id. at 619–21; see also DANIEL R. PINELLO, GAY RIGHTS AND AMERICAN 
LAW 110–13 (2003) (making a similar point).   
195 Gil Seinfeld, The Federal Courts as a Franchise:  Rethinking the 
Justifications for Federal Question Jurisdiction, 97 CAL. L. REV. 95, 112 
(2009) (arguing that things like second amendment claims may be more 
favored in a federal forum). 
196 Barry Friedman, Under the Law of Federal Jurisdiction:  
Allocating Cases Between Federal and State Courts, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 
1211, 1222 (2004). 
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courts is contingent, both in terms of time and in terms of the 
nature of the particular federal rights at stake. 
Even setting that general point aside, there is a much 
more specific reason why concerns about trust should not act 
as a barrier to the proposal being suggested here.  Those who 
lack trust in state courts are generally uncomfortable giving 
those courts additional power to decide claims.  But in this 
case, the additional power being conferred is a power to 
decline to decide claims.  In this sense, the proposal is 
consonant with the intuition that state judges may not 
always be equipped to decide claims based on federal law or 
the laws of other states.  In those circumstances, the best 
course is not to force the state to render a decision that may 
contain errors but not be subject to adequate review, or to 
permit the state to substitute some other law in favor of the 
law that is either unfamiliar or disagreeable.  Rather, it is to 
provide for the state courts something akin to the abstention 
doctrines that permit otherwise competent federal courts to 
decline to decide state claims when certain conditions are 
satisfied.197  Those abstention doctrines are invoked not as a 
way to offend state law, but to respect it.  Similarly, this 
proposal furthers the goal of ensuring that courts deciding 
claims on the merits are unbiased and competent, and for 
that reason it should enhance rather than undermine our 
sense of trust in the judicial system.198   
 
                                                          
197 See generally Leonard Birdsong, Comity and Our Federalism in 
the Twenty-First Century:  The Abstention Doctrines Will Always be 
With Us—Get Over It!!,  36 CREIGHTON L. REV. 375 (2003) (discussing 
various forms of federal abstention and their trajectories and usefulness 
in the twenty-first century); David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and 
Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (1985) (arguing that jurisdictional 
discretion under the abstention doctrines is expansive); Martin H. 
Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial 
Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71 (1984) (generally disapproving of federal 
abstention as violative of separation of powers, namely, undermining 
Congress’s discretion to regulate jurisdiction). 
198 See Verity Winship, Aligning Law and Forum 19 (draft) 
(discussing situations where the alignment of law and forum should be 
encouraged or required). 
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B. Authority 
 
The fact that a reverse abstention power should 
enhance trust in the judicial system—or that such a power 
might be a good idea for any other reason, for that matter—is 
ultimately irrelevant and unavailing if the power cannot be 
justified as a matter of constitutional authority.  Therefore it 
is necessary to assess whether the Constitution can sustain a 
reading that would permit states to decline to decide federal 
and sister-state claims.   What follows here is a sketch of that 
assessment.199  
The Supreme Court’s inflexible understanding of the 
constitutional constraints imposed by the Supremacy Clause 
and to a lesser extent by the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
should be updated to reflect contemporary realities.  While a 
federal power to impose an unyielding obligation on state 
courts may be justified as constitutional in the absence of an 
established system of federal courts, or in a context where a 
refusal to decide would result in meaningful interference 
with the legal rights, the same power may become unjustified 
once those affiliating circumstances have changed.  In other 
words, the availability of a reverse abstention power may be 
contextual and contingent both on historical developments 
and on the practical effects of particular institutional 
arrangements. 
This is an argument that draws on several recent 
developments in constitutional interpretation and 
federalism.  A starting point is Lawrence Lessig’s theory of 
translation.200  As a general matter, translation supports the 
                                                          
199 A comprehensive account of the authority for reverse abstention is 
the subject of future work.  See Samuel P. Jordan, Polyphonic Abstention 
(forthcoming).   
200 See generally Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. 
REV. 1165 (1993) (formulating a “translation” theory of constitutional 
interpretation that accommodates, and indeed requires assessment of, 
historical context).  In Lessig’s oft-quoted formulation, “to be faithful to 
the constitutional structure, the Court must be willing to be unfaithful to 
the constitutional text.”  Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism:  
United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 125, 193 (1995).  One could in 
fact trace this sort of argument back much further.  See, e.g., Theodore 
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possibility of a flexible understanding of constitutional 
powers that is informed by constitutional structure, and it 
has been deployed in the specific domain of federalism to 
suggest the development of extra-textual constitutional rules 
that would preserve the balance between federal and state 
power contemplated by the Constitution.201  Drawing in part 
on notions of translation, Robert Schapiro has more recently 
developed a theory of polyphonic federalism that provides 
additional authority for a reverse abstention power.202 
Schapiro’s work is part of a larger scholarly attack on the 
dualist nature of Supreme Court doctrine in the area of 
                                                                                                                                         
Eisenberg. Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal Court 
Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498, 501 (1974) (arguing that the permanence 
of lower federal courts in the modern era necessitates reevaluation of 
Congress’s constitutional authority to restrict their jurisdiction). 
201 Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism:  United States v. Lopez, 
1995 SUP. CT. REV. 125, 192 (1995) (arguing that the Supreme Court 
should be free “to craft, to construct, to make-up, limits on regulative 
authority, both state and federal, so as to check the growth in the 
commerce power, to the extent that growth has set the original balance 
[between the federal and state powers] askew”); see also Ernest A. Young, 
Making Federalism Doctrine:  Fidelity, Institutional Competence, and 
Compensating Adjustments, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1733, 1175–76 
(2005) (advocating for “compensating adjustments” that allow judges to 
re-work the federalism balance that is broadly and incompletely 
embodied in the constitutional text); Larry Kramer, Understanding 
Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1502 (1994) (“The best 
[constitutional] interpretation is one that accommodates both goals [of 
federalism] and faithfully transposes them onto modern circumstances.”); 
but see John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in 
Constitutional Interpretation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2003, 2040 (2009) 
(arguing that the constitution did not impose any “balance” that can be 
maintained by translation); Bradford R. Clark, Translating Federalism:  
A Structural Approach, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1161, 1162 (1998) 
(criticizing Lessig’s approach for its failure to respect separation of 
powers).  Orin Kerr has put forward an approach to the Fourth 
Amendment that balances the concerns of originalists, translators, and 
living constitutionalists by carefully limiting the circumstances that will 
allow a change in constitutional interpretation.  Orin S. Kerr, An 
Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. 
REV. 476, 531–32 (2011). 
202 See generally ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM 
(2009). 
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federalism.  Under a dualist framework, power “must be 
allocated to either the national government or state 
governments.”203  Polyphonic federalism, like other 
“compatibilist” theories of federalism,204 focuses instead on 
the question of “how to harness the dynamic interaction of 
state and federal power.”205  But Schapiro’s work is 
particularly important because it seeks to move beyond 
claims of instrumental benefit and situate the argument at 
the level of constitutional theory.206  Garrick Pursley has 
usefully described Schapiro’s theory as one that creates space 
for the consideration of polyphonic values like plurality, 
dialogue, and redundancy in the development of federalism 
decision rules.207  That space and those values can support 
the right of state courts to decline jurisdiction in a manner 
that preserves legal rights. 
                                                          
203 ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM 82 (2009). 
204 Garrick Pursley, Federalism Compatibilists, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1365, 
1367 (2011).  Other “versions” of compatibilist arguments abound.  See, 
e.g., Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s Federalism:  
Preemption, Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 
DUKE L.J. 1933, 2020 (2008) (advocating constitutional “realism”); Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Empowering States:  The Need to Limit Federal 
Preemption, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 69, 74–75 (2005) (outlining a theory of 
“empowerment” federalism that broadly construes federal regulatory 
powers while narrowing the scope of preemption); Philip J. Weiser, 
Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative Federalism, 79 
N.C. L. REV. 663, 665 (2001) (approving Congress’s “middle ground 
solution between the extremes of dual federalism and preemptive 
federalism” that “outstrip[s] existing constitutional rhetoric which 
envisions a separation [between state and federal spheres] that does not 
exist in practice”). 
205 ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM 82 (2009). 
206 As such, it attempts to respond to the criticisms lobbed at theories 
of “new federalism” on the grounds that the theories pay insufficient 
attention to the limitations imposed by constitutional text.  See, e.g., 
Stuart Minor Benjamin and Ernest A. Young, Tennis with the Net Down: 
Administrative Federalism Without Congress, 57 DUKE L.J. 2111, 2119 
(2008); H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., The Quixotic Search for a Judicially 
Enforceable Federalism, 83 MINN. L. REV. 849, 895 (1999). 
207 Garrick Pursley, Federalism Compatibilists, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1365, 
1367, 1383 (2011). 
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Finally, even if a reverse abstention power is not 
constitutionally compelled, it may be statutorily created.  
Congress has a clear source of power to provide states with 
increased authority in both the horizontal and vertical 
contexts. With respect to federal claims, Congress is 
ultimately responsible for choosing which courts will have 
jurisdictional authority.208  This means that state courts 
already rely on federal jurisdictional statutes, and there is no 
reason why those statutes could not also include a federally 
approved mechanism that would permit state courts to 
refuse federal claims in particular contexts and under certain 
conditions.  In other words, the statutory choice facing 
Congress need not be viewed as a binary one between 
exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction, but could also include 
forms of discretionary jurisdiction that would give state 
courts the authority but not the obligation to decide federal 
claims.  Similarly, with respect to horizontal claims, 
Congress has the power under Article IV to legislate the 
effect of the laws of the states.209  Legislation that requires 
states to deal with claims based on the laws of sister states in 
a non-prejudicial manner would easily fit within the scope of 
that power.  In short, even if the constitutional contours of 
                                                          
208 See Martin v. Hunters’ Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 340 (1816) (finding 
that state courts are empowered and expected to hear federal claims).    
Bankruptcy cases are one example of the lower federal courts’ exclusive 
jurisdiction.  See 11 U.S.C. § 1334 (2006); see also 13 CHARLES ALAN 
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE JURISDICTION § 3527 (3d 
ed. 2002) (listing other subject matter within the federal courts’ exclusive 
jurisdiction).  The Court generally requires express language from 
Congress that “affirmatively divest[s] state courts of their presumptively 
concurrent jurisdiction.”  Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 
820, 823 (1990).  However, exclusive jurisdiction may also be created “by 
unmistakable implication from legislative history, or by a clear 
incompatibility between state-court jurisdiction and federal interests.” 
 Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478 (1981). 
209 U.S. CONST. art. IV (“And the Congress may by general Laws 
prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall 
be proved, and the Effect thereof.); see also Yarborough v. Yarborough, 
290 U.S. 202, (1933) (reasoning that Congressional power over full faith 
and credit allows the doctrine to be expanded or contracted from its 
constitutional minimum). 
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judicial federalism are viewed as both fixed and inconsistent 
with reverse abstention power, all is not lost. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
States should have greater flexibility and power to 
determine the extent to which they decide claims that are 
rooted in the law of other actors within our federal system.  
The current approach to these questions is unduly 
restrictive, particularly with respect to federal claims.  Given 
the current structure of personal jurisdiction and the 
developed nature of the federal courts, these restrictions are 
unnecessary.  Standard principles of comity will generally 
encourage a state to entertain federal and sister state 
claims.210  But if a state, for whatever reason, decides that it 
does not want to hear such a claim, the decision to abstain 
should be respected so long as it does not meaningfully 
prejudice the claim or the legal rights involved.  
  
                                                          
210 Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for 
Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663, 689–90 (2001) (noting that 
comity promotes cooperative federalism values and state sovereignty);  
Charlton C. Copeland, Federal Law in State Court:  Judicial Federalism 
Through a Relational Lens, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 511, 530, 540 
(2011) (disparaging “allocation” of jurisdiction, instead promoting 
“relational” jurisdiction based on reciprocity and comity concerns).  
However, Louis Weinberg has argued against comity principles and 
suggested that multistate policy and “collective advantage” may be better 
supported by consistently applying forum law. Louise Weinberg, Against 
Comity, 80 GEO. L.J. 53, 58, 70–73 (1991)(arguing against comity 
principles and suggesting that multistate policy and “collective 
advantage” may be better supported by consistently applying forum law).  
  
